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NATO, GREECE AND THE 2004 SUMMER OLYMPICS

by

Jason John Brianas

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Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Donald Abenheim
Hans-Eberhard Peters

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<p>Since the end of the Cold War the Alliance's transformation has erased doubts about its survival. NATO continues to adapt to new threat environments by expanding its mission scope to out-of-area operations and by assuming new security missions. For the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens, Greece, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States and subsequent 11 March 2004 Madrid bombings in Spain complicated an already robust Greek security plan.</p> <p>Greece's extensive security planning, in addition to coordinating NATO support, highlighted the challenges and readiness requirements for the Alliance in the 21st century. Terrorist concerns, burden-sharing, recognition of Greek sovereignty, political limitations in deploying NATO's CBR Defense team and NRF utilization were all elements of the challenges faced in security preparation for the Games.</p> <p>In assessing the dynamics behind NATO's history and its security participation in the 2004 Summer Olympics, this thesis serves as a case study in the continuing transformational role and adaptability of NATO. Overall, the Alliance's willingness to assume security support to a major international sporting event represented its long-time relationship with Greece, its ability to perform significant security missions and its commitment to and solidarity with its allied members.</p>		

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NATO, GREECE AND THE 2004 SUMMER OLYMPICS

Jason J. Brianas
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1997

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Author: Jason John Brianas

Approved by: Professor Donald Abenheim
Thesis Advisor

Professor Hans-Eberhard Peters
Second Reader

Professor James Wirtz
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

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ABSTRACT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	PURPOSE.....	1
B.	IMPORTANCE.....	1
C.	MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT	2
D.	METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES.....	2
E.	BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY	3
II.	THE HISTORY OF GREECE AND NATO	5
A.	THE ORIGINS OF GREEK FOREIGN POLICY.....	5
B.	IMPLEMENTING THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE.....	8
C.	GREEK-NATO TENSION OVER CYPRUS, 1955	11
D.	THE DECLINE OF U.S. DEPENDENCY	12
E.	THE JUNTA AND TURKISH INTERVENTION IN CYPRUS.....	14
F.	THE KARAMANLIS YEARS, 1974-1981	16
G.	GREECE AND NATO INTO THE 21 ST CENTURY	19
III.	NATO TRANSFORMATION AND ITS ROLE IN OLYMPIC SECURITY	21
A.	HISTORY OF NATO SECURITY TRANSFORMATION	21
1.	The Impact of the Harmel Report.....	21
2.	NATO Strategic Concepts.....	22
3.	The Terrorist Attacks on 11 September 2001 and Beyond	23
B.	NATO AND OLYMPIC SECURITY	27
1.	Greece's Negotiations with NATO	31
2.	NATO's Commitment to the Summer Olympics	33
IV.	ANALYSIS OF GREEK – NATO COOPERATION.....	37
A.	ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION AND RHETORIC.....	37
B.	NATO'S “OUTER CORE” SECURITY MISSIONS	43
C.	NATO CHALLENGES	46
1.	Burden-sharing	46
2.	Czech Political Limitations on NATO.....	47
D.	GREECE AND EUROPEAN SECURITY.....	49
V.	CONCLUSION	51
A.	GREECE AND ITS REGIONAL STATUS	51
B.	THE FUTURE OF NATO AND NATO SECURITY.....	54
	LIST OF REFERENCES.....	59
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	67

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Security During the Olympics	42
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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Greek Opinion on Security Specialists	38
Table 2.	Greek Opinion on NATO Assistance	40

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to examine NATO's role in providing security for Greece during the 2004 Summer Olympics. As NATO continues to redefine itself and seek new missions since the end of the Cold War, the focus will be analyzing how NATO's security role for the Olympics is affecting the Greek – NATO relationship and the legitimacy of NATO as a whole. In assessing the dynamics behind NATO security actions for the Summer Olympics the intent is to gain a better understanding of the transformational role of NATO and it's implications toward the future of the Alliance.

B. IMPORTANCE

The 2004 Summer Olympics were awarded to Greece in 1997 by the International Olympic Committee, and were held 13 August – 29 August 2004. In the last several years, dramatic changes have occurred in international security. Athens took great measures to prepare itself for the Olympic Games. NATO's willingness to involve itself in the security of the Olympics serves as a case study in understanding the dynamics behind the institutional process within NATO. With NATO participation in security for the Summer Olympics, this is another chapter in the Greek – NATO relationship that has existed since Greece's accession in the Atlantic Alliance in 1952.

While NATO has been redefining itself, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States further complicated the security structure. On 12 March 2004, the day after the Madrid bombings in Spain, Greece officially requested NATO assistance. Although this request had been anticipated for some time, Greek political debate on constitutional issues regarding foreign military involvement within Greece's territorial borders, rhetoric for international support, increasingly demanding security issues and long-standing concerns of domestic terrorism have all influenced Greece's path to Olympic Summer games. Since the last Summer Olympics in Sydney the cost of security more than tripled to over \$1 billion. NATO's willingness to share in the burden of security responsibilities in Greece not only is beneficial to NATO's survival, but critical to understanding the dynamics behind the NATO institutional process and how it continues to benefit the relationships within the Alliance and the Alliance itself.

C. MAJOR QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT

The questions are the following:

- What is the significance for NATO in providing security at a major sporting event such as the Summer Olympics?
- What is the history between Greece and NATO and how have the dynamics within this relationship affected security arrangements at the Olympics?
- What are the institutional and operational implications for NATO and its allies within the Alliance given its security involvement in the 2004 Summer Olympics?

The argument follows:

The 2004 Summer Olympics was hosted by Greece and it came at a time of NATO transformation and heightened security against terrorism since 11 September 2001. International attention was high. Although some believe NATO continues to live beyond its expiration date, this event was an ideal tool that should strengthen the premise NATO continues to adapt in order to meet new security threats and challenges. This international event will contribute to the further understanding of the modern dynamics within the NATO institutional process.

The planning, protection and execution considerations of the Olympics are representative of the complex security issues facing Europe today. NATO is a flexible alliance that demonstrates its ability to seek out new missions in today's terrorist threat environment. Analyzing how this sporting event influences security concerns and why NATO seeks involvement in this mission is indicative of the dynamics behind NATO's flexibility and European national security concerns. NATO's actions at the 2004 Summer Olympics represent another chapter in NATO's history that reflects the importance of Alliance security mission preparedness. The level of cooperation in the Greek – NATO relationship within the context of this event is representative of the flexibility that must exist in order for NATO to continue to transform and remain a credible institution.

D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

This thesis examines the elements of NATO security involvement in the 2004 Summer Olympics hosted by Greece. Examining Greek and NATO history is important

context within the focus of tracing the events that shaped the security structure for the Games. By tracing the evolution of events between Greece and NATO, the main assumption is Greece's absolute intention of being prepared for the security of the 2004 Summer Olympics. Analytical approaches are used to assess official Greek and NATO statements and various sources. My focus is on senior Greek and NATO government officials, to include member nation leaders as appropriate, and their interaction on the national and NATO decision-making process.

My primary sources are high-level speeches, policy, journal articles and archives. Secondary sources are news sources, books with reference to official and/or declassified documents, and official government/NATO website references.

E. BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY

In the early part of 2004, as world attention focused on the crisis in Iraq, Summer Olympics preparations came at a rapid pace, with many outside observers concerned about its readiness during an era of heightened terrorism and counter-terrorism efforts. These games were significant not only because they returned to their birth place, Greece, but because it was the first time the Summer Olympics were held in a post-September 11 world. Its importance was notable. Olympic security preparations came at a time when the world now faced the modern security concerns of terrorism, and for Greece, the host nation of the 2004 Summer Olympics, security planning for the Olympics was a critical time in which it is faced enormous pressure to guarantee the safety of the Games. At the same time, hosting a successful Olympics meant the prospects of a reemerging new and modern Greece.

While some may perceive Greece ancient in its way of thinking and steeped in its desire to preserve tradition, Greece has managed to integrate and achieve continued cooperation in external security actors, that being NATO and the European Union. Having been a member of NATO since 1952, Greece has been a long-time member of NATO sharing the burdens and benefits of collective defense. NATO, in its post-Cold War transformation, established its relationship with Greece to assist in maintaining stability and security in Southeastern Europe.

As Greece made final security arrangements for the Summer Olympics, NATO was ready to support Greece in enhancing the security capabilities for the Olympics. In analyzing Greece and its evolving identity in relation to its membership within NATO, Greece's hosting of the 2004 Summer Olympics highlighted recent dynamics behind the nature of the Greek- NATO relationship. This paper will assess the elements of this relationship as Greece manages its own national identity and as NATO engages in security missions of the 21st century.

In an attempt to outline research findings, several observations become evident. First, NATO's involvement in the Games is a continuation of its new security direction firmly established in the 1990s. Second, Greece's request for NATO support revealed elements of Greek domestic public opinion and national security concerns that have long been rooted in Greek history; for NATO a continuing act of balancing Greek national strategy and NATO transformation commitments. Third, the consequences of such security missions, as it experienced in the Summer Olympics, indicate NATO will continue to face these challenges when planning similar missions. Fourth, NATO's security mission for the Olympics, even though peripheral or in the "outer core" mission spectrum contributed to the success of the Games, protecting Athens from terrorism, fulfilling a concrete security requirement NATO is currently able to perform. Understanding NATO's role in the 2004 Summer Olympics and Greece's impact on the overall security arrangements during the Games is part of a continuing assessment of the dynamics surrounding NATO and its adaptability to the 21st century.

The first chapter discusses Greece's history of foreign intervention and Greece's needs for NATO security. The second chapter highlights NATO transformation and its new efforts toward security and its global outlook in its fight against terrorism. This chapter also describes NATO security role during the 2004 Summer Olympics. The third chapter analyzes Greek and NATO cooperation in meeting the security requirements for the Olympics. The final chapter concludes with observations from the Greek-NATO experience during the Olympics. While Greece and NATO encountered challenges while framing NATO involvement in the security for the Summer Olympics, the benefits of the Alliance's contribution are a reflection of continued efforts to promote allied solidarity and security commitments for the 21st century.

II. THE HISTORY OF GREECE AND NATO

Athens alone- Greece with its immortal glories- is free.¹

A. THE ORIGINS OF GREEK FOREIGN POLICY

In understanding Greek foreign policy after World War II two long-term trends stand out: (1) its strategic location and (2) its history of foreign intervention. Since ancient times Greece's location has placed it at a crossroads marked by influence from the West and East. From the Holy Roman Empire to the Ottoman Empire, Greeks endured change.² In the 19th century the West, with its European ideals described the Greek War of Independence (1821-1831) as “a sentimental search for the Greek roots of European culture.”³ Lord Byron’s romantic portrayal of Greek independence inspired many to come to the aid of Greek revolutionists.⁴ To him and others, “Greece...was not just any country in which a war of independence had broken out, but one which in antiquity had served as an example of all that was most manly, heroic, and beautiful. Greece deserved to be free.”⁵

In reality, Greece’s strategic significance was apparent through the early intervention of the Great Powers. Britain, France and Russia, as Greece’s “protectors” vied for influence with the Greek state in both domestic and international affairs.⁶ After World War II, however France’s influence lessened and Britain, into the late 1940s was

¹ Wolff, Larry, *Inventing Eastern Europe: The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 2. Quote from Winston Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech given in Fulton, Missouri at Westminster College on 05 March 1946.

² For a history of Greece refer to C.M. Woodhouse, *Modern Greece: A Short History*, (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1998).

³ Mosse, George L., *Fallen Soldiers- Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 28.

⁴ Ibid, 29.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ *Greece: A Profile*, Chapter 1, “International Foreign Policy Up to the Second World War,” (Athens: International Studies Association, 1988), 1.

increasingly unable to financially support Greece.⁷ With British leadership unable to continue its financial support to Greece, the rising threat of communism, and the increasing concerns of Greek Civil War further destabilizing the region, the United States came to the aid of Greece. In order to fully affect the recovery of Greece, the U.S. played a major role in Greek development. In coming to the aid of Greece, what became known as the “Truman Doctrine,” became the first phase “in a far larger design still to be worked out in the form of the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty.”⁸

By the end of 1946 several international developments prompted the U.S. administration to become more involved in the Eastern Mediterranean region. George Kennan’s Long Telegram, Winston Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech, Soviet pressure toward Turkey for annexation of the Black Sea straits to the Soviets,⁹ the advance notification of Britain’s increasing inability to support Greece and Turkey, and the start of civil war (between communist insurgents and the Greek government) in Greece all heightened concerns about the spread of communism. All these factors carried influence, but it was George Kennan’s Long Telegram that drove the ideological desire to “contain” Soviet expansion. In February 1946, George Kennan, the U.S. ambassador to Russia, sent his “Long Telegram” from Moscow to U.S. leadership. His letter effectively alerted policymakers to the sources of Soviet hostilities. As a response to Soviet expansionist behavior, he suggested strong resistance which would deter and ultimately weaken the Soviet regime against the “Western World.”¹⁰ In what became known as a policy of “containment,” President Truman developed an ideological doctrine to fight the

⁷ Goodpaster, Andrew J., “The Truman Doctrine: Turning Point in World History,” *The Truman Doctrine of Aid to Greece: A Fifty-Year Retrospective*, Rossides, Eugene T. and Demetrios James Caraley ed., (New York, NY: American Hellenic Institute Foundation and The Academy of Political Science, 1998), 43. Great Britain officially informed the United States of its inability to support Greece and Turkey against Soviet influence in February 1947. Hamby states advance notice of Britain’s inability to support Greece was actually given earlier in the fall of 1946, 21.

⁸ Hamby, Alonzo L., “Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the Truman Doctrine,” *The Truman Doctrine of Aid to Greece: A Fifty-Year Retrospective*, Rossides, Eugene T. and Demetrios James Caraley ed., (New York, NY: American Hellenic Institute Foundation and The Academy of Political Science, 1998), 22.

⁹ Hamby, 21. According to the author, in a move of symbolic support toward Turkey, remains of the deceased Turkish ambassador who had passed away in Washington were returned to Turkey on the USS Missouri.

¹⁰ Harper, John Lamberton, *American Visions of Europe- Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson*, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 191.

oncoming perils of communism; Greece was strategically located at the center of this fight.

In the summer of 1946 Greek delegates meet in Washington to discuss Greece's financial situation.¹¹ Out of this meeting the American Mission for Aid (AMAG) was conceived. Later in 1947 an American survey of the economic conditions in Greece was reported on through a memorandum known as the Porter Report, whereby the extent of U.S. involvement in Greek policy was revealed:

The Greek Government should be induced to employ American citizens as individuals in key executive positions. These men who will be selected with the advice of the Mission will be in a position to see that official policy is carried through in the day-to-day operations of the government.¹²

What was becoming apparent was, in the words of Theodore Kariotis, “the future of Greek economic development lay exclusively in the hands of American planners responsible not only for the reconstruction of the Greek economy but also for its future path.”¹³ Here, the ideological opportunities alluded to earlier involving “containment” of the Soviet Union laid the groundwork for significant U.S. involvement in Greece. The Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East region, no doubt, posed both ideological and specific strategic benefits:

Only Greece, Turkey, and Iran separated the Russians from the ‘Black gold’ of the Persian Gulf, and each of these nations, in the eyes of U.S. policymakers, appeared dangerously susceptible to Soviet influence and control.¹⁴

Defending Greece from communism was “crucial to control of...that veritable crossroads between East and West: the eastern Mediterranean, which offered access to

¹¹ Kariotis, Theodore C., “The Economy: Growth Without Equity,” *Greece in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Theodore A. Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis and Fotini Bellou, (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 245.

¹² Ibid, 246. The author describes the Porter Report actually as two reports; one classified “confidential” and another classified “secret.” The “secret” report was published in Greece, but the “confidential” version was not. This quote is the “confidential” version. Kariotis also notes the “secret” published report used language such as, “‘foreign’ individuals who would advise the Greek Government,” implying a more politically acceptable language in light of the belief that the U.S. were the primary influence in Greek affairs.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Wittner, Lawrence S., *American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 36.

the oil-rich Middle East and therefore presented the alluring possibility of America's enemies forcing the demise of its West European allies..."¹⁵

Post World War II, Greece was a country devastated by war and ravaged by German Nazi occupation, yet its national Greek culture had survived just as it did under Ottoman rule in the 1800s.¹⁶ While the Greek government endured civil war against insurgent Greek communists (ELAS),¹⁷ remaining British forces assisted in maintaining a moderately stable political base oriented toward Western ideals.¹⁸ This allowed Greece to maintain relatively stability in order to begin its recovery, but it would ultimately mean relying on U.S. leadership. Greece needed to rebuild its country and it was the Americans who saw ideological opportunities in utilizing Greece to further U.S. foreign policy.¹⁹

B. IMPLEMENTING THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

Through the Truman Doctrine Greece became a vital part of the U.S. grand strategy of "containment", one that would later expand to NATO and its allies throughout the Cold War. In practical terms, the Truman Doctrine and later, together with the Marshall Plan took the form of significant external support offering extensive military and economic aid to Greece. On 12 March 1947 President Truman proposed support to Greece in a speech to Congress. In asking for \$400 million in aid to Greece and Turkey he also made it known that, "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities and outside

¹⁵ Jones, Howard, "A Reassessment of the Truman Doctrine and Its Impact on Greece and U.S. Foreign Policy," *The Truman Doctrine of Aid to Greece: A Fifty-Year Retrospective*, Rossides, Eugene T. and Demetrios James Caraley ed., (New York, NY: American Hellenic Institute Foundation and The Academy of Political Science, 1998), 26.

¹⁶ For a complete history on this period refer to *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism*, Gondicas, Dimitri and Charles Issawi ed., (Princeton, New Jersey: The Darwin Press, Inc., 1999).

¹⁷ For a complete history of the domestic and external dimensions of the Greek Civil War refer to: John O. Iatrides, "Greece at the Crossroads, 1944-1950," *Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and Its Legacy*, Iatrides, John O. and Linda Wrigley ed., (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995).

¹⁸ Payne, Stanley G., *A History of Fascism: 1914-1945*, (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), 317.

¹⁹ This is a reference to the eventual U.S. policy of "containment" which is discussed on the following page.

pressures.”²⁰ With an overall view of Greece needing significant aid, the United States, through the Truman Doctrine and later, with the added insurance of the Marshall Plan, intended to promote a liberal ideology and reconstruction effort of the Greek economy²¹ and Europe. To Kennan, “the Truman Doctrine and NATO were reasonable translations of containment, but they seemed too dependent on military strength and too neglectful of moral leadership.”²² Having to rely on close diplomatic and economic ties to the U.S., Greece was heavily influenced by the West.²³ Despite criticism, the Greek-Turkish aid bill passed in Congress and was signed into law on 22 May 1947.

Several months after President Truman’s famous speech to Congress, the U.S. began operationalizing its aid promises. On 15 July 1947 AMAG arrived in Greece and began to assist Greek leadership. U.S. political influence was strong in three areas: the establishment of a monarchy, control over Greek parliamentary dynamics and influence with the Greek army.²⁴ First, the issue of the monarchy is significant because of its history and what it meant to the Greek elite. In general the Greek monarchy structure had always been supported by three European powers: Britain, France and Russia.²⁵ At the end of World War II, France’s ability to intervene had been weakened and Britain and Russia were left to intervene in Greek matters. Although this made foreign relations complex for Greece, with the British unable to continue its support in the late 1940s, the U.S. had come to view the monarchy as a source of stability, “a stable political body around which anti-communist political forces could unite” with the King being the “ultimate guarantor of political stability, military preparedness and loyalty to the western

²⁰ From Truman Presidential Museum and Library online, *Student Activity: Harry Truman and the Truman Doctrine*, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/teacher/doctrine.htm>. Accessed 07 September 2004. Note: aid went to Turkey as well.

²¹ Tayfur, M. Fatih, *Semiperipheral Development and Foreign Policy: The Cases of Greece and Spain*, (Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003), 44.

²² Kaplan, Lawrence S., *NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance*, (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994, Updated ed.), 14.

²³ Tayfur, 46. In 1948 Greece signed the US-Greek Economic Agreement and in 1953 it agreed to devalue the Drachma in order to open its economy and increased Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).

²⁴ Ibid, 49. Couloumbis in *Greece in the Twentieth Century*, 38, notes American intervention from 1947-1949 helped to end the Greek Civil War by preventing communist success. The Greek majority acknowledged this by building a statue of Harry Truman.

²⁵ For a complete history dating back to the War of Independence from the Ottomans, refer to *Greece: A Profile*, Chapter 1, “International Foreign Policy Up to the Second World War,” (Athens: International Studies Association, 1988).

alliance.”²⁶ In order to further U.S. success, however, sentiment in the Greek Parliament had to be stabilized as well. Secondly, the U.S. desire to control parliamentary discord focused on bringing together both liberal and conservative forces that largely disagreed over the authority of the monarchy.²⁷ The U.S. was able to compel both sides to cooperate in order to receive aid, thus uniting the parliamentary forces.

Lastly, significant U.S. involvement also appeared in the Greek military chain-of-command. Influence in the Greek army, as Tayfur puts it, was “the main bastion of the Americans.”²⁸ The reason for this is understandable from the perspective of the U.S. Given communist involvement in the Civil War and the potential pressures that could come from communist Russia, the U.S. had no choice but to make the Greek army a critical role in the defeat of communism.²⁹ All of these factors demonstrate the deep involvement the United States had in Greek administration and policy; a level of assistance that starting in the early 1960s would lead to Greek leadership desiring other “alliances” beyond NATO.

On 04 April 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was finally signed. With the political and economic support established through the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan in 1947, support for collective defense, in order to protect the Euro-Atlantic region to allow for the recovery of Western Europe. In 1952 the ex-chief of the Greek Military Staff, Marshal Papagos became the head of the conservative Greek Rally Party and won the elections. Leading conservative Kanellopoulos, stated, “Greece’s membership in the NATO was a very good thing and hence prolonged debates on the subject were not required” believing this would, “insult the western allies.”³⁰ Thus, despite apparent opposition, both Greek right wing and centrist parliamentary elites were able to place great importance on NATO membership. What this meant however, was:

²⁶ Tayfur, 48. The author quotes J.O. Iatrides, “American Attitudes Toward the Political System of Postwar Greece,” from *Greek-American Relations: A Critical Review*, (NY: Pella Publishing Company, 1980), 49-73.

²⁷ Ibid. The source of disagreement over this issue seems to originate from a rift between King Constantine and Prime Minister Venizelos at the outbreak of World War I. The King wanted to remain neutral (because he was married to one of the German emperor’s sisters) while the Prime Minister favored siding with the Allies. For complete reference refer to note 22, Chapter 1, 6.

²⁸ Ibid, 49.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Tayfur, 52.

Defense and security policies and investments would be planned according to the needs of the Atlantic Alliance rather than Greece's specific interests. In other words, NATO membership would be beneficial only if Greek 'national interests' coincided with the global interests of the Alliance.³¹

On 18 February 1952 Greece joined NATO. During the 1950s Greek national security paralleled U.S. foreign policy. Support to the Greek army and armed forces included American equipment, training and education to hundreds of officers.³² Specifically in the Greek army, its secret agents and intelligence capabilities, served as the main agent against internal threats, the "internal enemy- communism."³³ Greece assumed this internally focused defense posture until the mid-1960s. NATO expectations of Greece consisted of a "delay to Soviet and satellite forces"³⁴ should there be an attack.

C. GREEK-NATO TENSION OVER CYPRUS, 1955

As NATO leadership worked to develop a nuclear strategy, however rising tensions on Cyprus in the mid-1950s caused increased tensions in Greece toward NATO. Increasing calls for *énosis*, the union of Cyprus with Greece, was strong with four-fifths of the Cypriot population being associated with the Greek "language, sentiment and religion."³⁵ In the summer of 1954 the situation was presented to the United Nations (UN), but later in December did not move to take any action. As a result, by April of 1955 both violence in Cyprus and ill feelings of inaction by the UN created, "bitter disappointment in the public mind both with Britain and the USA, whose representatives voted with the British and the UN,"³⁶ further aggravated the crisis. According to Woodhouse this "outbreak of nationalism" brought about a Turkish reaction of nationalism.³⁷ Although the Greek government attempted to manage the crisis, anti-Greek violence in Istanbul forced Greek forces to leave a NATO exercise and reduce its

³¹ Tayfur, 52.

³² Dokos, Thanos P., "Greece in a Changing Strategic Setting," *Greece in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Theodore A. Couloumbis, Theodore Kariotis and Fotini Bellou, (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 45.

³³ Tayfur, 50.

³⁴ Dokos, 45.

³⁵ Woodhouse, 269.

³⁶ Woodhouse, C.M., "Modern Greece," *A Short History of Greece*, Heurtley, W.A., H.C. Darby, C.W. Crawley and C.M. Woodhouse (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 166.

³⁷ Woodhouse, C.M., *Modern Greece: A Short History*, 270.

involvement from other allied activities.³⁸ Even though the North Atlantic Council was unable to resolve the crisis in 1955, later in 1960, under the auspices of NATO, Greece, Turkey and Cypriot leaders agreed to establish Cyprus as an independent Republic.³⁹ The election of Constantine Karamanlis in 1955, though, brought a new Greek policy orientation toward NATO. Greece would support NATO, but also look to Europe for new support.

In the early 1950s Constantine Karamanlis was a rising star in the Greek Rally Party. As the Minister of Public Works, he became recognized under the Prime Minister Papagos. After Papagos' death Karamanlis was chosen by the King to form a new party. Under the name of the National Radical Union (ERE) his first term of office lasted until 1963. While in office, Karamanlis believed:

Greece's fortunes lay with the West and that Greece must become 'European'. Karamanlis wanted to move closer to Europe than membership in NATO alone, so in 1962 he won associate status for Greece in the European Community.⁴⁰

Additionally, Karamanlis looked to Europe as a political "model." In interpreting this model, Arghyrios Fatouros believes, "membership in the EC meant, among other things, the entrenchment in Greece of democratic government, that is to say, fundamental freedoms, majority rule, the rule of law- what other terminology is called the bourgeois parliamentary system."⁴¹

D. THE DECLINE OF U.S. DEPENDENCY

With these economic concerns and political motives, the early 1960s brought forces to bear in Greek politics that combined for an influence away from U.S. pressures. According to Tayfur two important events changed Greece's foreign policy orientation, "the association of Greece with the EEC and the enactment of new incentive laws for the inflow of foreign investment capital." The impact of these developments he believes,

³⁸ Woodhouse, 273.

³⁹ Ibid, 279.

⁴⁰ http://www.gogreece.com/learn/history/Rise_Karamanlis.html. Accessed 05 August 2004.

⁴¹ Fatouros, Arghyrios A., "Political and Institutional Facets of Greece's Integration in the European Community," *Greece, the New Europe, and the Changing International Order*, Edited by Harry J. Psomiades and Stavros B. Thomadakis, (New York, New York: Pella Publishing Company, Inc., 1993), Chapter 2, 29.

“challenged the vested interests of the American-oriented, periphery-like traditional economic elite.”⁴² And so, ultimately, these economic pressures challenged American interests. By 1962 economic additional economic pressure on Greece came from the termination of U.S. civil aid. The economic revival experienced in the 1950s was slowing and this provided further incentive for Greece to seek out economic support. In 1962 Greece signed the Athens Agreement, which was intended to assist Greece toward full membership.⁴³ The Athens Agreement was based on Article 238 of the Treaty of Rome and it was aimed to bring equilibrium to the balance of payments, balance economic growth and stabilize price volatility.⁴⁴ The economic state and its uncertainty toward stability led to unrest.⁴⁵ Both political parties in the early 1960s, that is, Karamanlis’ ERE and George Papandreu’s Center Union Party (CU), (which came to power starting in 1964) resisted U.S. pressure. After assuming office, Papandreu pushed to revise foreign investment agreements and desired a shift to “import substitution industrialization.”⁴⁶ Even the conservative Karamanlis, “despite his anti-Communist and pro-American credentials, began to resist U.S. influence and manipulation.”⁴⁷

It was also during the mid-1960s that George Papandreu’s son, Andreas, became a rising notable in Greek politics. Expected to follow in his father’s footsteps, he “was linked by public opinion...toward the Left.”⁴⁸ Together, the Papandreous believed things needed to change, “the Americans would have to learn that Greece belonged to Greeks,

⁴² Tayfur, 55.

⁴³ Kondonassis, Alexander J., “Greece and the European Common Market,” *Greece: Today and Tomorrow, Essays on Issues and Problems*, Constantelos, Demetrios J. and Constantine J. Efthymiou ed. (New York, NY: Krikos, Inc., 1979), 75.

⁴⁴ Ibid, 83. Within the agreement were several points, including a \$125 million loan toward infrastructure and industrial projects, tariff reduction, consideration of the elimination of EEC tariffs on certain Greek products such as tobacco, olives, “harmonization” of agricultural policies within 22 years. A full list of basic provisions can be found on pages 81-83.

⁴⁵ Woodhouse, C.M., *Modern Greece: A Short History*, (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1998), 283. The author includes an interesting note: In 1962 Greece was spending one third of its budget on defense.

⁴⁶ Tayfur, 57.

⁴⁷ Ibid, 59. Author references Couloumbis, *Foreign Interference in Greek Politics. A Historical Perspective*, (NY: Pella Publishing Company), 1976. Tayfur also discusses additional funds initially received from the EEC, a loan of \$125 million and later in 1966 \$90 million from the European Monetary Fund on pages 58-59.

⁴⁸ Woodhouse, 287.

that it was an ally but not a satellite.”⁴⁹ At the time, it was thought the rising support the Papandreas received could damage U.S. interests with the King fearing a potential end to the Greek Monarchy.⁵⁰ A change in control, however, did not come through elections; it came in the form of a military coup in April 1967.

E. THE JUNTA AND TURKISH INTERVENTION IN CYPRUS

Anti-western, specifically anti-American sentiment was most visible during the military dictatorship period of rule from 1967-1974 and the subsequent Turkish intervention into the island of Cyprus. After the resignation of George Papandreas in 1965 and the failure to obtain stability through several cycles of governments, King Constantine set elections for May 1967. On 21 April 1967 a military coup took place assuming control of the Greek government.⁵¹ During the coup, NATO allies “confined themselves to verbal condemnation because the regime fulfilled every geopolitical requirement, anchoring the alliance’s defenses in the unstable eastern Mediterranean.”⁵² By 1973 the military regime, or junta, was losing control as evidenced in its brutal response to a student demonstration at the National Polytechnic University of Athens in November 1973. In July 1975, when Greek Cypriots, supported by the junta,⁵³ attempted to overthrow the Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios, on 20 July 1975 the Turkish government intervened and moved troops into the Kyrenia region.⁵⁴ Observers soon learned that the *coup d'état* was backed by the U.S. government. In effect, this knowledge, coupled with a U.S. diplomatic stance oriented toward mutual support of Turkey gave further reason for the Greek political elite to seek alternate relationships,

⁴⁹ Tayfur, 62.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Gallant, 71. The coup was performed by a group of junior officers who were apparently fearful of losing their position of military status because of their role in previous right-wing conspiracies. Additional, but “flimsy” motives, according to the author, included delaying a communist victory and defending a “Helleno-Christian” civilization.

⁵² Ibid, 72.

⁵³ Wilson, Andrew, *The Aegean Dispute*, Adelphi Papers, No. 155 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1979), 18. The junta, referred in this document as the “Athens Junta” gave its support to EOKA, a guerilla group that believed in *énosis*. This was the same group in the late 1950s that played a role in Cyprus winning its independence in 1960.

⁵⁴ Wilson, 18. It was the Turkish government’s belief that a coup in Cyprus would be a preliminary step toward *énosis*.

more multilateral in nature to meet its security needs. The junta period and its resulting effect on the island of Cyprus was a significant period in Greek history.

Greek popular opinion reflected the perceived failure of the United States and NATO to act on Greece's behalf. Furthermore, apparent U.S. support of Turkish actions created a severe backlash that lead Greece to temporarily leave the NATO integrated military structure.⁵⁵ According to S. Victor Papacosma, Karamanlis "later divulged that only two choices lay before him: to declare war against Turkey or to restrict links with NATO. He chose, in his estimation, the lesser of evils."⁵⁶ Soon after, relations became more positive and Greece rejoined NATO, but despite a period of *détente* with NATO since that time, elements of this historical tension still exist.⁵⁷

Increasingly, Greek leaders realized NATO could not alone offer the security requirements Greece felt it needed. The rule of the military dictatorship and NATO's non-compliance in coming to the aid of Greece, in Greek eyes, served to embitter relations between Greece and NATO. What became clear in the late 1970s was a movement to abandon its dependence on the U.S. in both military and political realms.⁵⁸

As Yiorgos Choulairas explains, "this fusion substantially accounts for why the fragility of heritages and identities is matched by their resilience."⁵⁹ Regarding Greece today, he brings interesting perspective to light:

The question regarding Greek culture...is neither whether Greeks will lose their "Greekness" nor whether they will cling to the myths of their

⁵⁵ Iatrides, John O., "The United States and Greece in the Twentieth Century," *Greece in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Theodore A. Couloumbis, Theodore Karriotis and Fotini Bellou, (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 96.

⁵⁶ Papacosma, S. Victor, "Greece and NATO: A Nettlesome Relationship," *A History of NATO- The First Fifty Years*, Vol. 3, Edited by Gustav Schmidt, (New York, NY: Palgrave Publishers Ltd., 2001), 364.

⁵⁷ In a poll given April 2004 regarding approval of NATO assistance on security matters during the Summer Olympics in Athens, 56% of those polled "Favored strongly and not strongly" NATO assistance while 35% "Opposed not strongly and strongly." VPRC Database 1994-2004. Note: see Chapter IV for this and other current public opinion information.

⁵⁸ Fatouros, Argytrios A., "Political and Institutional Facets of Greece's Integration in the European Community," *Greece, the New Europe, and the Changing International Order*, Edited by Harry J. Psomiades and Stavros B. Thomadakis, (New York, New York: Pella Publishing Company, Inc., 1993), Chapter 2, 29.

⁵⁹ Chouliaras, Yiorgos, "Greek Culture in the New Europe," *Greece, the New Europe, and the Changing International Order*, Edited by Harry J. Psomiades and Stavros B. Thomadakis, (New York, New York: Pella Publishing Company, Inc., 1993), Chapter 5, 83.

national character. Instead, the question is how will Greeks reinvent themselves in the context of a reinvented Europe.⁶⁰

New direction and concrete action toward democratic consolidation came with Karamanlis returning to power after the military coup ended in 1974. Maybe not necessarily a “reinvention,” but Karamanlis’ beliefs and charisma became an important factor in bringing Greece closer to the EU, by moving “in the direction of becoming a ‘civil society.’”⁶¹ The Truman Doctrine had lost its luster. While valuing American support, Greece would look to foreign policy options that meant less direct U.S. intervention.

F. THE KARAMANLIS YEARS, 1974-1981

With Constantine Karamanlis’ appointment to Prime Minister on 24 July 1974, democratic elections were held and under a new party name, New Democracy, (center right in orientation) he was elected into office in late 1974. By the early 1970s, economic, political and security transformations were all taking place. In 1974 several key developments took place that defined Greece’s independence from Western influence: the disestablishment of the monarchy, the installation of civilian rule over the military, and the shift away from its Atlanticist stance in NATO. Karamanlis, having returned from self-exile in Paris, took to reform. He first abolished the monarchy. In a referendum, approximately 70 percent of voters, voted against it.⁶² What was once a political structure that maintained close relations with American leadership and, “established as the agent of foreign powers” was officially ended in December 1974.⁶³

Likewise, in addition to this political change he also took measures to orient the Greek military toward defense as opposed to direct political influence.⁶⁴ He believed the military should, “be transformed into a respectable organization that would satisfy both its members and Greek civilians.”⁶⁵ Ultimately, “after years of active intervention in

⁶⁰ Chouliaras, 84.

⁶¹ Couloumbis, 38.

⁶² Bellou, 161.

⁶³ Tayfur, 83.

⁶⁴ Ibid, 83. The author references the experiences of the junta period and the handling of the Cyprus crisis.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

Greek politics, the military was subordinated to civilian rule.”⁶⁶ Finally, Karamanlis took further domestic action in an effort to fully consolidate Greek democracy by legalizing the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) was an important additional act that essentially “moved the country to its Western destiny.”⁶⁷

Another critical change in Greece came with Karamanlis’ shift in 1974 away from full support toward the Atlantic Alliance. Tayfur points to several reasons why this occurred. First, as a result of what he terms “inaction” from NATO to respond to the Turkish intervention in Cyprus, Greece withdrew from the military structure of NATO in August, showing, “Greek ‘national interests’ would now come first, and would no longer be sacrificed to the interests of NATO or the U.S.”⁶⁸ To the Greeks, the Turkish intervention was an attack. After the Cyprus crisis in 1974, Greece’s security concerns focused on Turkey’s “revisionist” policy toward Greece.⁶⁹

In addition to Greece’s general policy shift away from NATO involvement, Greece took specific action in deciding to reduce the number of U.S. bases located in Greece from seven to four and transferred control of the bases to Greece, “with the insistence that the operation of the bases would be permitted only when it was considered necessary for Greek national interests.”⁷⁰ According to Tayfur, the result of Karmanlis’ new direction (of re-orienting Greece’s position in its trans-Atlantic relations) meant Karamanlis could begin with his intention of pursuing Greek membership into the EC. In looking first to France and Germany, Karamanlis desired to lessen its security reliance on the U.S. by initiating military contracts with France and by generating interest in French investment.⁷¹

In William H. McNeill’s book published in 1978, he commented on Greece’s aspirations in joining the EC saying, “the thought that Greece may now be ready to ‘join

⁶⁶ Ibid, 84.

⁶⁷ Bellou, 162. The KKE had been banned from 1949, the end of the Greek Civil War, until 1974.

⁶⁸ Tayfur, 86.

⁶⁹ Dokos, 49. The author references, among the many Greek concerns, concern came from Turkish declarations such as those made by then Turkish Prime Minister Demirel in which he said (in 1975) “...half the Aegean is ours. Let the whole world know that this is so...We know how to crush the heads of our enemies when the prestige, dignity and interests of the Turkish nation are attacked.”

⁷⁰ Tayfur, 86. He also notes an agreement to home-port the U.S. 6th Fleet came to an end.

⁷¹ Ibid, 87.

Europe' by becoming a member of the Economic Community has a considerable appeal in a time when Greeks keenly feel the need for external support against the Turks."⁷²

His point at first seems unsupported, but additional research reveals he may be more accurate than initially expected. In tracing Greece's efforts to utilize NATO and the EU to provide security, Panayotis Tsakonas and Antonis Tournikiotis stated,

NATO's 'failure' to provide Greece with the expected security guarantees intensified...the search for an alternative. In fact, Greece's membership in the EC, though largely economically motivated, was also meant to bolster the existing Greek government and, most importantly, to strengthen the country's international position, especially its deterrent capability against Turkey.⁷³

A few years later, in 1980, and after "lengthy negotiations" Greece's full membership into NATO was reinstated.⁷⁴ Approximately six years after Greece withdrew from the military structure of NATO due to its dispute over Turkish involvement in Cyprus, Greece finally became a full member of NATO again. (In 1981 Greece joined the EC). This very fact demonstrates the delicate nature of the Greek-Turkish relationship and what it means to the Alliance. This history demonstrates the importance of unique Greek security concerns over a long period of time in regards to Turkey. As expressed by Geoffrey Pridham:

Karamanlis' careful handling of relations with Turkey during the later 1970s was driven by his overriding concern for democratization, for any out-break of conflict might have had destabilizing effects at home. The link between this and the European option had a profound meaning for a country with a background of foreign intervention.⁷⁵

Overall, historical disagreements regarding Aegean airspace, territorial waters, and challenges to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention have generated ebbs and flows of

⁷² McNeill, William H., *The Metamorphosis of Greece Since World War II*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), 249.

⁷³ Tsankonas, Panayotis, and Antonis Tournikiotis, "Greece's Elusive Quest for Security Providers: The 'Expectations-Reality Gap,'" *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 34(3), 2003, 307.

⁷⁴ Dokos, 58. The author references full integration back into NATO based on the "Rogers Report."

⁷⁵ Pridham, 195.

tension between Greece and Turkey. The Imia crisis in January 1996 was one example of heightened tension, leaving the two alliance members close to war.⁷⁶

G. GREECE AND NATO INTO THE 21ST CENTURY

A year later, 1997 proved to be a better year for NATO and Greece. As a measure of good faith, Greece and Turkey signed the Madrid Joint Declaration, agreeing to “settle their differences with peaceful means, on the basis of mutual consensus and without the use, or threat of use, of violence.”⁷⁷ More concrete results with Greece and NATO came with the new headquarters role in Larissa as one of the four Joint Sub-Regional Commands.⁷⁸ During the years 1998 and 1999, the NATO bombing campaign in the Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) brought significant public opposition to the NATO bombings. According to a poll by the Greek newspaper *Ta Nea*, 95 percent of Greeks opposed NATO’s actions.⁷⁹ Although opposed to military action, Greek Foreign Minister Papandreu did not reject NATO’s decision.⁸⁰ The Greek government’s delicate handling of managing domestic pro-Serb orientations was an initial signal of Greece’s turn to cooperative regional foreign policy.

As history has demonstrated the Greek- NATO relationship has often hinged on the status of relations between Greece and Turkey. In recent years, Greece has engaged in a *rapprochement* with Turkey. In 2000, earthquakes and U.S. encouragement came through visits by President Clinton. According to an article in the *Los Angeles Times*, then Greece Foreign Minister George Papandreu and Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem signed five agreements in an effort to “build enough trust to help tackle the most sensitive disputes between the neighboring North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies—over rival territorial claims in the Aegean Sea and over how to reunify ethnic Greek and Turkish communities on the partitioned island of Cyprus.”⁸¹

⁷⁶ Dokos, 49.

⁷⁷ Papacosma, 369.

⁷⁸ Ibid, 370.

⁷⁹ Stanley, Alessandra, “NATO Bombing Tears at Greek Loyalties, Reawakening Anti-Americanism.” *The New York Times*, 25 April 1999, p. 1.13, accessed through ProQuest 28 September 2004.

⁸⁰ Papacosma, 373.

⁸¹ Boudreux, Richard, “Turkey and Greece Enter ‘New Era’ with Accords.” *Los Angeles Times*, 21 January 2000, p. 12.

As evidenced in this chapter, the year 1974 was a significant year in the history of Greece, for its own sake and in relations with NATO. It marked the symbolic trek toward its own destiny. As Dokos notes, politically, this new period of history from 1974 to the present, “has been characterized by the diversification of Greece’s external relationships, including a relative weakening of its ties with the U.S. in favor of closer economic and political integration into Western Europe and improved relations with Eastern Europe.”⁸²

The year 1974 was also significant because, as in previous years, it demonstrated how the unique regional tensions between Greece and Turkey can affect their NATO relationship. NATO has always been aware of the stresses Greek-Turkish disputes put on the Alliance. In recent years, *rapprochement* between Greece and Turkey has been promising. Greece has been following a positive policy orientation toward NATO and with the EU and, in rhetoric, the newly elected Greek Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis expressed his desire for Greece “to be among the avant-garde in the newly enlarged EU.”⁸³

For several decades, starting in the mid- 20th century, the relationship between Greece and NATO was uneasy at times, but always strategically beneficial. NATO valued Greece’s membership and solidarity in securing the Alliance’s southern flank, while Greece relied on NATO to balance against any Turkish action. Since the mid 1970s Greece has positioned itself ever closer to its European neighbors. Today, Greece looks to regional leadership, strong ties to the EU and NATO and seeks global recognition as a modern Greece for the 21st century.

⁸² Dokos, 46.

⁸³ Mahony, Honor, “Greece Wants to be among the Avant Garde in the EU.” *EU Observer*, 09 August 2004. Available at <http://www.euobserver.com/?aid=17061>. Accessed 09 August 2004.

III. NATO TRANSFORMATION AND ITS ROLE IN OLYMPIC SECURITY

Throughout its history, NATO has always been ready to meet new threats and seize new opportunities. That is why the Alliance still matters and why NATO remains the key to stability and security of the Euro-Atlantic area.⁸⁴

A. HISTORY OF NATO SECURITY TRANSFORMATION

In April 1949 NATO was established under the individual and collective defense premises within Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Granted, when the Treaty was established, its inherent aim was to protect allied members from the aggression of the former Soviet Union. Within the Treaty, however, fundamental security obligations were given, as reflected in Article 4, “The parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”⁸⁵ NATO, throughout the Cold War, played an important role in maintaining strategic stability through its core collective defense function. Yet, even during the Cold War, pursuing security concerns were evident in NATO strategy.

1. The Impact of the Harmel Report

In 1967 NATO formally addressed these security concerns through the Harmel Report. Based on a dual track of continuing defense measures and achieving détente between the East and West, efforts were aimed at increasing the security of NATO members through military and political mechanisms. The impact of the Harmel Report was significant because it laid the groundwork for future Alliance security measures. According to author Stanley Sloan, in what may be the most lasting contribution of the Harmel Report, was reflected in the efforts in the 1980s which culminated in agreement to the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. It served to “help ease the transition from Cold War confrontation to a more cooperative security system in Europe.”⁸⁶

⁸⁴ Grossman, Marc, “New Capabilities, New Members, New Relationships,” *NATO Review*, Summer 2002. Available online: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue2/english/art2.html>. Accessed 01 October 2004.

⁸⁵ *NATO Handbook*, (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Office of Information and Press, 2001), 527.

⁸⁶ Sloan, Stanley R., *NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered*. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 50.

2. NATO Strategic Concepts

Towards the end of the 20th century several events influenced a new strategic direction for NATO. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and reforms in the Soviet Union in early 1990 dissolved the strength behind the Iron Curtain. Quickly following, coalition operations and crisis in the former Yugoslavia pressed the Alliance to pursue new strategic direction. As reflected in its 1991 Strategic Concept, the Alliance demonstrated the desire for a new broad approach to security.⁸⁷ NATO's role in the Balkans became an opportunity for its new security, peacekeeping functions. In what was the largest NATO military action taken in its history, NATO began its presence in the region with the Implementation Force (IFOR) and then sustained its operations with the Stabilization Force (SFOR). From its new Strategic Concept NATO allies took several important steps forward that allowed the Alliance more flexibility. In 1994 at a Brussels summit allied members agreed to the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, which allowed greater flexibility and a more adequate command structure in order to provide for new security missions.⁸⁸ In 1996 NATO produced the Berlin Accord, an important document that signaled NATO's move toward the European Security and Defense Identity (EDSI). Accordingly, "the Berlin Accord was designed to help transform NATO's role for the post-Cold War world, respond to calls from Congress for more effective sharing of international security burdens, and accommodate a more cohesive European role in the alliance."⁸⁹

As seen later in its 1999 Strategic Concept, in addition to its core defense functions, it addressed security concerns for the 21st century: weapons of mass destruction (WMD), proliferation of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) weapons, terrorism, sabotage and organized crime, the "disruption of the flow of vital resources" and the "uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people, particularly as a

⁸⁷ *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, (Rome, 08 November 2001) NATO Basic Texts. Available at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b911108a.htm>. Accessed 30 November 2004.

⁸⁸ Sloan, 92.

⁸⁹ Ibid, 99.

consequence of armed conflicts.”⁹⁰ This was a critical strategic step considering what was to come in 2001.

3. The Terrorist Attacks on 11 September 2001 and Beyond

On 11 September 2001, within 24 hours of the terrorists attacks against the United States on the Pentagon and World Trade Towers, NATO invoked Article 5 of the Treaty. Although the U.S. decided not to use NATO in its Afghanistan operations initially, NATO agreed to take individual and collective action to support operations against terrorism. Based on a request from the United States, on 04 October 2001 NATO Secretary Lord Robertson made a statement reflecting eight areas in which NATO was ready to assist in the war against terrorism:

- Enhanced intelligence sharing and cooperation
- Providing assistance to Allies, under terrorist threat, while engaging in supporting operations against terrorism
- Increased infrastructure security on U.S. and allied territory
- Replace NATO assets that need to be utilized for direct support of terrorist operations
- Give blanket overflight clearances to U.S. and allied aircraft for military operations against terrorism
- Provide access for U.S. and allied forces to port and airfield facilities on NATO territory during anti-terrorism operations
- Readiness to deploy STANAVFORMED assets to the Eastern Mediterranean for purposes of presence and allied solidarity
- Readiness to deploy NATO AWACS in support of operations against terrorism⁹¹

In accordance with these areas of readiness, specifically the last point, NATO made another unprecedented move: to send AWACS to assist in air surveillance over the U.S. during Operation Noble Eagle as an Article 5 operation.⁹² Officially known as Operation

⁹⁰ *The Reader's Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington: 23-25 April 1999*, (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1999), 50-51. In original form, the 1999 Strategic Concept can be found at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>. Accessed 30 November 2004.

⁹¹ Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General. “Statement to the Press,” on the North Atlantic Council Decision on Implementation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty after the 11 September attacks against the U.S., NATO HQ, Brussels, 04 October 2001. <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011004b.htm>. Accessed 13 October 2004.

⁹² Romano, Lois, “NATO Lends a Hand With U.S. Sky Patrol; In Role Reversal, Foreign Crews Defend U.S.,” *The Washington Post*, pg. A.03, 19 November 2001.

Eagle Assist, seven NATO AWACS provided surveillance operations from 19 October 2001 to 16 May 2002.⁹³ In concluding the assistance operations, *The New York Times* reported NATO AWACS having flown more than 360 missions, consisting nearly a quarter of all AWACS flights flown over the U.S during that period with 830 crew members from 13 allied nations.⁹⁴ According to Nora Bensahel, writing for RAND, five NATO AWACS were deployed to the United States and in February 2002 two additional NATO AWACS were sent to provide security over Salt Lake City, Utah during the Winter Olympics.⁹⁵ For NATO, Operation Eagle Assist was very significant for several reasons: it symbolized Alliance solidarity and it marked the beginning of new security missions for NATO: surveillance for major public events. As shown later in Chapter IV, NATO's surveillance assistance, coordination and information sharing in securing airspace for a specific event became a model for future NATO security missions.⁹⁶

As NATO looked to the Prague Summit later in 2002, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks were the driving force behind NATO's commitment to transformation and defending against acts of terrorism. In 2002 NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson spoke to developing Alliance responsibilities directed toward terrorist threats. Specifically, he gave four areas where NATO military roles could continue to be of benefit: (1) terrorist threat identification; (2) protection of military and civilian infrastructure as well as populations; (3) response mechanisms to terrorist attacks; and (4) preemptive military action against terrorists.⁹⁷ These areas of NATO-focused responsibilities toward new security threats were formalized at the Prague Summit in November 2002. Top priorities for NATO at the Summit included responses to the WMD threat and transforming NATO military capabilities in three aspects:

⁹³ "NATO Prepares to End Its Patrols of U.S. Skies," *The Washington Post*, pg. A.13, 02 May 2002.

⁹⁴ Schmitt, Eric, "NATO Planes to End Patrol of U.S. Skies," *The New York Times*, pg. A.22, 02 May 2002.

⁹⁵ Bensahel, Nora, *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), 9.

⁹⁶ Only a month later, in June 2002, for example, NATO agreed to provide AWACS surveillance over Rome, Italy during a Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) meeting. Several other similar missions followed.

⁹⁷ Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General, *NATO-Russia Cooperation in Combating Terrorism: A Good Idea Whose Time Has Come*. Speech given at the NATO-Russia Conference on the Military Role in Combating Terrorism at the NATO Defense College in Rome, 4 February 2002. Available at website: <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020204a.htm>. Accessed 29 September 2004.

- Streamlining NATO military command structures
- Developing a NATO Response Force
- Improving military capabilities in specific areas, especially in intelligence and surveillance, flexible deployment capability, increased force protection and defense against nuclear, biological and chemical weapons⁹⁸

On 21 November 2002, NATO Heads of State and Government declared their commitment to a strengthened NATO based on furthering measures outlined in its Strategic Concept. The Prague Summit Declaration reflects new commitments to increased security and stability through the Mediterranean Dialogue, the NATO-Russia Council and Partnership for Peace (PfP). Additionally, the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) was approved.⁹⁹ PCC was an important step for the Alliance because it replaced the “uneven progress” seen through the non-“nation-specific” commitments made in 1999 through the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI).¹⁰⁰ Under PCC, individual NATO countries agreed to focus on mission-specific capability improvements.

Given the roles identified by Lord Robertson in early February 2002 and the agreements made at the Prague Summit, NATO’s participation in the security construct for the 2004 Summer Olympics is a reflection of new emphasis on its security capabilities. In December 2003, the outgoing NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, stressed an important point about capabilities. Improving NATO’s military capabilities “has to remain the key priority of any Secretary General because the credibility of the Alliance depends on it having the capability to take action.”¹⁰¹

In 2003 Allied members took action to increase security operations in the Euro-Atlantic region, both by indirect and direct support of the Olympics. In the lead up to the Summer Olympics, the Alliance took important steps to increase its capabilities and

⁹⁸ *The Prague Summit and NATO’s Transformation: A Reader’s Guide*, (NATO 2003), 4. Available at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/rdr-gde-prg/rdr-gde-prg-eng.pdf>. Accessed 13 October 2004.

⁹⁹ “Prague Summit Declaration,” *The Prague Summit and NATO’s Transformation: A Reader’s Guide*, Chapter III: Documentation, (NATO 2003), 73. Available at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/rdr-gde-prg/rdr-gde-prg-eng.pdf>. Accessed 13 October 2004.

¹⁰⁰ *The Prague Summit and NATO’s Transformation: A Reader’s Guide*, (NATO 2003), 26.

¹⁰¹ <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/nato/03121602.htm> Interview with NATO’s Outgoing Secretary General Robertson, U.S. Department of State: International Information Programs, 16 December 2003. Accessed 07 January 2004.

further NATO's security goals. In September of 2003, NATO conducted its first maritime and amphibious capabilities exercise in the Irish Sea under a new Higher Readiness Force Headquarters. This exercise, named Northern Light 2003, was significant because it was a testing ground for NATO expeditionary maneuvers, as it developed its NATO Response Forces (NRF) capabilities.¹⁰² The United States participated in this exercise along with several other European nations.

Additionally, on 05 March 2003, the United States recognized NATO efforts to expand its naval patrols to increase security in the Mediterranean region. Under Operation Active Endeavour, which was considered part of the Summer Olympics mission for NATO, Alliance naval forces assumed missions to escort Allied non-combatant ships traveling through the Straits of Gibraltar. With the U.S. Navy that has decreased in size over the years to just over 300 ships, this was a welcomed gesture,

The consensus to extend Operation Active Endeavour to the western Mediterranean strengthens NATO's counterterrorism capability and demonstrates NATO's firm commitment to meeting the threat of terrorism wherever it may come.¹⁰³

Further support to the 2004 Summer Olympics came in March and April through Joint Task Force (JTF) Exercise Agile Response 2004 which served as an eight-day international cooperative effort with Greece again designed specifically to support the Summer Olympics. This exercise “tested joint command-and-control functions, refined response options to numerous simulated contingency scenarios, and demonstrated the strength of “One Team – One Fight.”¹⁰⁴ One of the main focuses on the exercise was to test and analyze JTF’s responses to scenarios for the Olympics. All of these joint operations represented more than just words. Such large-scale coordination is “action,” representative of a strengthening and committed Alliance to transformation and enhanced allied cooperation. As one would expect, NATO has many challenges ahead in managing

¹⁰² *NATO Conducting Crisis Response Exercise in Irish Sea*, U.S. Department of State, NATO press release, 17 September 2003, <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/nato/03091700.htm>. Accessed 07 January 2004.

¹⁰³ Boucher, *U.S. Welcomes Expansion of NATO Naval Patrols in Mediterranean*. U.S. Department of State, NATO Press Release, <http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/nato/03030502.htm>, 05 March 2003. Accessed 24 May 2004.

¹⁰⁴ <http://www.c6f.navy.mil/News%20Releases.htm>, *Joint Task Force Wraps Up Exercise in European Theater*, Press Release # 13-2004, 2 April 2004. Accessed 19 May 2004.

expanding missions and maintaining allied cooperation with existing and new members. David Yost, professor at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California notes:

The challenge is to preserve the Alliance's coherence and effectiveness while reconciling the traditional role of collective defense with the new roles of cooperation with non-NATO countries in the Euro-Atlantic region, and crisis management and peace operations...Significant problems of practical implementation have arisen and threaten to continue, involving disagreements among the NATO countries and, in some cases, participants in the Partnership for Peace. Managing these problems and disagreements and preserving the Alliance's ability to fulfill its traditional core mission of collective defense, as well as the new roles, will represent an enormous challenge.¹⁰⁵

Today, NATO demonstrates a wide range of collective defense and security mission capabilities, but improvement continues. The Alliance is enhancing its capabilities and expanding its regional cooperation efforts. In this respect, 2004 was an important year for NATO. At the Istanbul Summit on 28 and 29 June, the Alliance, consisting of 26 member countries, agreed to expand its operations in Afghanistan, committed to training Iraqi security forces, acknowledged the full operational status of its CBRN Defense Battalion as well as the initial operational capability of the NRF, and enhanced regional cooperation in the Mediterranean and Middle East through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.¹⁰⁶ As it approached the Olympics, NATO's priorities were on Afghanistan and Iraq, but its security coordination with Greece was not limited. The next section explores the effort and extent of NATO's significant role in the Summer Olympics in more detail.

B. NATO AND OLYMPIC SECURITY

Since 11 September 2001 a heightened terrorist threat meant unprecedented security measures for the Olympics. Through bilateral relations, Greece and the United States worked together to essentially prepare Athens before NATO's arrival.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁵ Yost, David S., *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 89-90.

¹⁰⁶ For more details refer to the *Istanbul Summit Communiqué*, NATO Press Release (2004)096, 28 June 2004, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm>. Accessed 16 November 2004.

¹⁰⁷ It should be noted here Greece also worked closely with several members of the international community through a seven-member Olympics advisory group which included Australia, Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Israel and the United States. For reports by the Athens 2004 Olympics Organizing Committee (ATHOC) and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) refer to: <http://www.ana.gr/towards2004/towards.htm>. Accessed 03 March 2004.

Although the United States used military action after the Al Qaeda attacks on 11 September 2001 beginning in Afghanistan, the fight began on many diplomatic fronts as well, Greece being one of them. In 2002, both the U.S. government and IOC pressured the Greek government to combat the terrorist organization 17 November (17N). For years, Greek rhetoric dominated and clouded any real effort to stop this domestic terrorism.¹⁰⁸ Both 17N and another domestic terrorist group, the Revolutionary Popular Struggle (ELA), who desired the end of U.S. and NATO presence in Greece, had a long history of attacking foreign representatives, U.S. and NATO officials.¹⁰⁹ It wasn't until the capture of an injured bomber though, in June 2002, that efforts to defeat November 17 dramatically increased.¹¹⁰ Despite Greek Police Chief Fotis Nasiakos' statement, "17N does not exist anymore," the U.S. State Department kept 17N on its list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations.¹¹¹

The U.S. had demonstrated a high degree of security concern for the 2004 Summer Olympics for many years. The source of this concern, of course, was the international threat of terrorism. On 08 March 2004, the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations met in a closed briefing to discuss security preparations for the Olympics games. One of the briefers was the Honorable Cofer Black, Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism. Despite the U.S. administration understandably trying to downplay the threat of terrorism publicly, as preparations for the Summer Olympics were being made, potential terrorist attacks were a legitimate concern. Initially, the Greek government and some elements within the U.S. Foreign Service were reluctant to admit a Balkan terrorist threat, for example. By January 2004, however, comments by U.S. and

¹⁰⁸ Bradley, Ed, co-host, *Athens 2004; Inability of Greek Government to Deal with Terrorist group 17 November*, (60 Minutes transcript from CBS), 11 August 2002. Accessed 26 February 2004.

¹⁰⁹ Sandler, Todd and Keith Hartley. *The Political Economy of NATO: Past, Present and into the 21st Century*. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 175.

¹¹⁰ Bradley. Note: Greek authorities were then able to capture 17N's suspected leaders and group members.

¹¹¹ Migdalovitz, Carol, "Greece: Threat of Terrorism and Security at the Olympics." *CRS Report for Congress*, (Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress: Order Code RS21833), CRS-2, 30 April 2004.

European officials, though, slowly revealed the likely presence of Islamist terrorists in the Balkans.¹¹²

Given this apparent evidence, intelligence experts continued to share terrorist information which was thought of to involve a new wave of terrorism against the Olympic Games.¹¹³ Osama bin Laden's public offer to the Europeans on 15 April 2004 regarding a "peace treaty" added possible credibility to a terrorist threat against the Olympics. With a "door of peace" that "remained open" for three months, his offer was a window of opportunity which expired several weeks before the Olympics began.¹¹⁴ While this may be an exaggerated revelation, nevertheless increased concerns for the Olympics Games led U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge, days later on 19 April 2004 to include the Olympics on a list of potential terrorist targets.¹¹⁵ While this threat may not have materialized, it was significant to intelligence agencies in that security for the Olympics was a high-priority to the Bush administration.

It is clear that NATO's support augmented an already serious Greek security plans. With the Hellenic Police, (the Ministry of Public Order) and the Olympic Games Security Division (OGSD) in charge of Olympic security,¹¹⁶ the Greek government took its responsibilities seriously. It contracted with a U.S.-based security company, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) to provide additional security measures in Athens. Although Greece is very concerned about its national sovereignty, it took measures early in 2000 to include the international community in security operations planning.¹¹⁷ Although discussions on NATO involvement in Greece actually took place

¹¹² "Terrorism Threats to Olympics and Balkans Now in Public Arena," *Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily*, Defense & Foreign Affairs/International Strategic Studies Association, Vol. XXII, No. 4, 12 January, 2004. www.nexis.com/research/search/document. (subscription only). Accessed 26 February 2004. Comments made by officials are due, in part, to "significant" information and intelligence supported by the Geographical Information System (GIS) stations located in Athens and Sarajevo.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Migdalovitz, CRS Report for Congress Order Code RS21833, CRS-3.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, CRS-4.

¹¹⁶ "History of the Olympic Games Branch," <http://www.kloa.mil/gr/about/en/history.htm>. Accessed 08 October 2004. For the Olympics, a "Presidential Decree" allowed the OGSD to cooperate with the Greek armed forces.

¹¹⁷ Migdalovitz. Note: For example, early coordination occurred routinely with its Olympic Advisory Group previously mentioned.

before the train bombing in Madrid on 11 March 2004, it was the day after this incident Greece officially requested NATO security assistance. The Greek decision to formally involve NATO was an important one for the Alliance. NATO participation in the Olympics represented NATO's continuing adaptability because it has the ability take action.

The Madrid bombings on 11 March 2004 in Spain only confirmed the need for an even greater extensive security plan. NATO's participation in the Olympics provided an overall "security umbrella"¹¹⁸ to an already extensive Greek Olympic plan.¹¹⁹ As explored in greater detail in the next section, the final security plan between NATO and Greece was a result of months of negotiations. After months of "informal" meetings on Olympic security in the early part of 2004 between senior Greek and NATO officials, the application to NATO reflected the degree of security measures necessary to protect the Olympics.¹²⁰ Even with the extensive security measures Greece had already taken in early 2004, former Defense Minister, Yiannos Papantoniou believed more assistance would have to be required. In an early interview on 09 March 2004 with *The Guardian*, Papantoniou referenced the Greek constitution and suggested a standby force would take the shape of the U.S. 6th Fleet patrolling offshore.¹²¹ The report also included the participation of a NATO Czech CBRN Defense battalion, with no specifics on role or location. According to the former Foreign Ministry's coordinator for the Games, in referencing the task of coordinating external support, stated "the logical and most efficient thing for Greece to do is to apply to NATO for assistance...NATO will ensure good coordination of assistance and, that way, we can avoid paying the price of

¹¹⁸ Term used by Despina Afentouli, NATO Public Information Officer for Greece. Interview available at: <http://nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040719a.htm>. Accessed 03 October 2004.

¹¹⁹ For details of the planning process (available to the public) refer to: "Olympic Security Planning," Olympic Games Security Division, http://www.mopo.gr/main/Attachments/Attachment10659_o_asfalia_eng.pdf, March 2004. Accessed 16 August 2004.

¹²⁰ Smith, Helena, "Greece to Ask NATO to Protect Olympics: Athens to Call in Alliance Despite Spending X430M on Security," *The Guardian*, 09 March 2004. From NATO Enlargement Daily Brief (NEDB), 10 March 2004.

¹²¹ Smith.

negotiating on a bilateral level with a variety of countries.”¹²² It was only a few days later when the official Greek request was submitted to NATO.

1. Greece’s Negotiations with NATO

After the center-right New Democracy party under Costas Karamanlis won the general elections on 07 March 2004, it was generally expected that Athens would request NATO support to ensure the Games’ security.¹²³ This expectation became a reality just one day after the 11 March 2004 terrorist Madrid bombings when Greece officially requested NATO assistance. On 12 March 2004 the Greek request compromised of four “demands”:

- Early warning aircraft
- Assistance of the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean in “patrolling international waters
- “the availability to Greece of a Battalion specialized in countering nuclear, biological, radiological and chemical incidents
- “the provision of other non-military means, such as rescue and sanitary units, decontamination of biological and chemical elements, as well as additional medical provisions.”¹²⁴

Less than a week later on 18 March 2004 the Greek request for NATO assistance to the Summer Olympics was unanimously approved by the NATO Council of Permanent Representatives in Brussels, with details to still be decided on. Greece’s Permanent Representative, Yiannis Zeppos thanked the Council and commented favorably on the Alliance’s solidarity and support for the Olympic Games.¹²⁵ During the following weeks expectations were high that NATO would assist Greece in order to make sure the Olympics were as secure as possible. According to the U.S. ambassador to NATO,

¹²² Smith.

¹²³ Carassava, Anthee, “Greek Conservatives’ Victory Ends Long Rule by Socialists.” *The New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com>, (subscription only). Accessed 08 March 2004.

¹²⁴ *NATO and the Olympic Games*, Hellenic Republic Ministry of Foreign Affairs office, http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/organizations/nato/Olympic_Games.html. Accessed 03 October 2004.

¹²⁵ Demiris, V. *NATO Council Approves Greek Request to Assist with Olympics Safety*, Hellenic Republic Embassy of Greece, <http://www.greekembassy.org>. 18 March 2004. Accessed 29 August 2004.

Nicholas Burns, NATO was responding “very positively” to the Greek request, as a formal decision to approve assistance was expected in “the coming weeks.”¹²⁶

Talks on exact security arrangements between Greece and NATO continued. On 16 April 2004 Commander of NATO’s Joint Force Command, U.S. Admiral Gregory Johnson met with Greek Armed Forces Chief General Giorgos Antonakopoulos and Public Order Minister Giorgos Voulgarakis to discuss the Alliance’s role in the Olympics. According to a Greek defense official, even though Greek government officials had said NATO would provide support outside Greece’s territory, Admiral Johnson was described as having “discussed the possible deployment of battalion officers near Athens.”¹²⁷

Months later on 22 May 2004 Greece and NATO finally agreed on security arrangements for the Olympic Games. According to Greek newspaper, *Athens Axia*, agreement was reached to use the NRF option as a deterrent standby force which would be deployed in manner to respond to an incident in Greece as necessary. This decision, however, was made with the intervention of Nicholas Burns, the U.S. Ambassador to NATO.¹²⁸ The agreement called for remaining NATO resources to be used as a “security package” which included AWACS patrols, ship inspections and teams trained in nuclear, biological and chemicals threats. Out of this agreement, it was understood Greece would act as leading agent and NATO would function as a support mechanism.

On 04 June 2004 Athens newspaper *Ta Nea* reported a Greek request to NATO for another battalion with the capabilities of emergency rescue. Not being a part of the “non-military” rescue capabilities initially requested, this new requirement for a NATO “evacuation team” was identified by security planners after several international security exercises had been conducted. Listed as a possible scenario is a mostly U.S. team under the NATO flag to respond from an aircraft carrier or large deck amphibious ship

¹²⁶ “United States Expects NATO will Approve Security Requests for Olympics, Euro Soccer,” *The Associated Press*, 26 March 2004. Available at: <http://web.lexis-nexis.com> under the International News section, (subscription only).

¹²⁷ “NATO, Greece Discuss Olympics Security,” *Associated Press* article from *Fox News Channel*, 16 April 2004. http://foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,117303,00.html. Accessed 26 May 2004.

¹²⁸ Ambassador Nicholas Burns’ role was unique in that in addition to being the former U.S. Ambassador to Greece from 1997 to 2001, he also speaks Greek. A more complete biography is available at: <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/6198.htm>. Accessed 17 November 2004.

steaming in international waters close to the Greek mainland.¹²⁹ (This article also mentions several NATO analysts being deployed to Athens to evaluate intelligence reports at the Olympics Information Center and through each nation's intelligence services, all a part of the original security package requested by Greece.)¹³⁰

2. NATO's Commitment to the Summer Olympics

There was no doubt in the Secretary General of NATO's mind when he announced the readiness and willingness of NATO to support the Olympics. During a visit to Athens on 19 and 20 February 2004 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said, "NATO can assist, NATO will assist, NATO is in a position to assist."¹³¹ In June 2004 Scheffer's ability to deliver became a reality. On 25 June 2004 Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) was authorized to begin NATO assistance to the Hellenic forces providing security to the Summer Olympics.¹³² NATO's role was officially outlined on 02 August 2004 when Joint Force Command (JFC) Naples released its first "Factsheet." NATO's operations officially termed Distinguished Games were supportive of the Hellenic government, while Greece retained full responsibility for overall security operations for the Olympic and Paralympic Games.¹³³ NATO's role was additionally characterized by being, "supplementary to Greek national operations...in a supporting and augmenting role" demonstrating "Allied solidarity in contributing to security for NATO members."¹³⁴ NATO's period of coverage, from 02 August to 30 September 2004 included both the Olympic and Paralympic Games with specific NATO support to Greece as follows:

- AWACS deployment for airspace surveillance
- Maritime surveillance through Operation Active Endeavour
- deployed elements of the NATO Multinational Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense Battalion (MN CBRN Def BN)

¹²⁹ Dhimakas, Loukas, "Greece Requests Deployment of NATO Evacuation Team During Olympics," *Athens Ta Nea*. 04 June 2004. FBIS. Accessed 05 August 2004.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ "NATO Ready to Assist in Olympics Security Operation," *NATO Update*, 19 February 2004. <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/02-february/e0219b.htm>. Accessed 03 October 2004.

¹³² "NATO Assistance to Greece: 'Distinguished Games,'" *JFC Naples Factsheets*, NATO Update 02 August 2004. Available at: http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Factsheets/Athens04/DistGames.htm. Accessed 11 August 2004.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

- improved intelligence sharing

The listed overall objective of Olympic security assistance was:

To demonstrate Alliance resolve and support to the campaign against terrorism, while underpinning the NATO Military Concept for Defense against terrorism through specific actions. The military objective of this activity is to assist Greek Military Authorities in ensuring the safe conduct of the 2004 Olympic and Paralympic Games.¹³⁵

Several more “Factsheets” followed adding to the scope of coordinated NATO and Greek security efforts. JFC Naples Factsheet “Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) 7” specified NATO air surveillance for the Olympics. One of five such operations centers, CAOC 7 was tasked to provide support to the 2004 Olympic and Paraolympic Games as follows:

- Plan air surveillance operations.
- Manage Hellenic airspace and coordinate with Greek air traffic assets and coalition forces.
- “Task the allocated assets for defensive air operations in allocated airspace.”
- “Coordinate air operations with Host Nation and, land and maritime forces.”¹³⁶

JFC Naples Factsheet “Task Force Endeavour” outlines NATO naval operations in the Mediterranean in support of the Summer Olympics. As noted by this Factsheet, Operation Active Endeavour was actually activated on 26 October 2001 as part of the NATO Article 5 response to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. The Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean (SNFM) provided direct support during the Olympics by providing “early warning of any vessels suspected of conducting or supporting an intended terrorist organization against the Games.”¹³⁷

¹³⁵ “NATO Assistance to Greece: ‘Distinguished Games,’” *JFC Naples Factsheets*, NATO Update 02 August 2004.

¹³⁶ “Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) 7 Larissa, Greece,” *JFC Naples Factsheets* (NATO Assistance to Greece: “Distinguished Games”) series. Available at: http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Factsheets/Athens04/CAOC.htm. 02 August 2004. Accessed 03 October 2004.

¹³⁷ “Task Force Endeavour,” *JFC Naples Factsheets* (NATO Assistance to Greece: “Distinguished Games”) series, http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Factsheets/Athens04/TaskForceE.htm. 02 August 2004. Accessed 03 October 2004.

Another JFC Naples Factsheet “Multinational (MN) CBRN Task Force (TF)” explained the contribution of NATO’s CBRN capabilities to security operations for the Summer Olympics. As a part of the NATO MN CBRN Defense Battalion, the CBRN TF was deployed to Halkida, Greece to support Hellenic CBRN capabilities in order to “mitigate the effects of a CBRN incident on the civilian population centres [*sic*] and/or Olympic Venue Sites.”¹³⁸ The CBRN TF’s missions in support of the Olympics and Paralympics were:

- Coordinate with local and civil defense agencies and establish contingency plans
- Establish an NBC Collection Center (NBC CC)
- Perform NBC surveillance
- Sample for CBR agents and perform lab analysis
- Perform personnel, vehicle and ground decontamination
- Execute station/site decontamination as needed

The final JFC Naples Factsheet “EADRCC Assistance to Greece” described in more detail NATO’s emergency planning efforts. Its scope included “civil emergency planning, disaster relief and consequence management” with coordination performed by the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC).¹³⁹ As a coordinating center for terrorist attacks during the Olympics, EADRCC was supported by 26 of the 46 Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) nations. Through EADRCC these nations (on a cyclical basis) made additional CBR and “disaster” response units available to deploy if required.

¹³⁸ “Multinational (MN) CBRN Task Force (TF),” *JFC Naples Factsheets* (NATO Assistance to Greece: “Distinguished Games”), http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Factsheets/Athens04/CBRN.htm. 09 August 2004. Accessed 03 October 2004.

¹³⁹ “EADRCC Assistance to Greece,” *JFC Naples Factsheets* (NATO Assistance to Greece: “Distinguished Games”) series, http://www.afsouth.nato.int/JFCN_Factsheets/Athens04/EADRCC.htm. 13 August 2004. Accessed 03 October 2004. Note: EADRCC was established in 1998 for EAPC nations as a means to respond to natural and technological disasters “within the EAPC geographical area.”

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IV. ANALYSIS OF GREEK – NATO COOPERATION

As seen through the history of Greece post World War II, Greek public opinion has been heavily influenced, fairly or not, by historical issues. Whether it is the legacy of U.S. involvement in Greek domestic affairs through the Truman Doctrine (as explored in Chapter II), Greek-Turkish disputes over Cyprus and the Aegean, or the high degree of opposition to the war against Iraq, Greek public opinion has played an important role in Greek national security. This was true for U.S. bilateral relations with Greece in negotiating security arrangements for dignitaries and athletes during the Olympics and for NATO's role in security support during the Games.

A. ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION AND RHETORIC

It is not a secret that in 2004 a number of organizations protested either the Olympics, U.S. influence in security measures or NATO involvement in the Games. On 25 February 2004, during an IOC meeting in Athens, protestors held a demonstration protesting against the installed surveillance measures in Athens. With protestors only numbering in the hundreds, the emotions of those protesting was reflected in this quote, “We don’t accept a police state or an invasion by the United States and NATO.”¹⁴⁰ Another event such as the Greek Communist Youth (KNE) Anti-Imperialist weekend, held on 10 and 11 July 2004, brought youth under the guise of the Communist Party of Greece together to protest NATO and multinational companies’ involvement in the Olympics.¹⁴¹ Yet another protest came later on 22 July 2004 when approximately 1,000 people marched against the Olympics due to “security excesses.”¹⁴² While these protests were small in number, history has its place in Greece.¹⁴³ According to *The New York*

¹⁴⁰ “Police Clash with Demonstrators Protesting Olympics,” *The Associated Press*, Lexis-Nexis, 25 February 2004. Accessed 26 February 2004.

¹⁴¹ “Greek Communist Youth Protests NATO, Multinational Involvement in Olympics,” *Athens News Agency*, FBIS, 10 July 2004. Accessed 05 August 2004.

¹⁴² Jury, Nicholas. “U.S., NATO Involvement in Olympic Security Sparks Anti-Americanism in Greece,” *Paris Le Figaro*, FBIS, 29 July 2004. Accessed 05 August 2004.

¹⁴³ Note: From the results of the 07 March 2004 elections in Greece, the Communist Party (KKE) won 5.89 percent of the vote and 12 seats in parliament, a small percentage compared to the 40 percent and above vote percentages for the PASOK and ND parties. More details are available in Migalovitz’s CRS Report for Congress, (Order Code RS21855), 03 June 2004.

Times, feelings of bitterness still reside in Greeks over the U.S. government's support of the junta from 1967 to 1974.¹⁴⁴ Konstantinos Kotzias believes:

The American involvement in the dictatorship and responsibility for the division of Cyprus were prominent themes which reinforced...the dogma of 'Proud Greece'...in which...socialist revolutionary ideas appealed to Greeks as they could historically identify with the struggle against foreign dominance.¹⁴⁵

Greece's temporary withdrawal from the NATO integrated military structure in 1974 due to NATO's "inaction" to respond to the Turkish intervention and its opposition to the war in Iraq¹⁴⁶ constitute historical points reflecting high points of Greek emotional public opinion. But, a recent public opinion survey adds context to understanding Greek public opinion. According to a poll taken by V. Project Research Consulting (VPRC) in April 2004, the intensity of opposition against foreign involvement during the Olympics reflected only a small percentage of the general population:

APPROVAL OF COOPERATION OF GREEK AND FOREIGN SECURITY SPECIALISTS FOR THE OLYMPIC GAMES

	April-04 (2) %
Favor strongly	43
Favor not strongly	38
Oppose not strongly	7
Oppose strongly	8
Don't know	4
N	1847

VPRC: Database 1994-2004

Question text: Do you favor or oppose Greek forces cooperating with foreign security specialists during the Olympic Games?

Table 1. Greek Opinion on Security Specialists.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁴ Carassava, Anthee. "Anti-Americanism in Greece is Reinvigorated by War," *The New York Times*, B12, 07 April 2003.

¹⁴⁵ Kotzias, Konstantinos. "September 11 and the War Against Terrorism: The Greek Reaction," *Contemporary Review*, November 2002, 264.

¹⁴⁶ According to a poll reference in the *New York Times* article, "Anti-Americanism in Greece is Reinvigorated by War," 94 percent of Greeks were against the war in Iraq.

¹⁴⁷ VPRC is an independent public opinion research organization located in Athens, Greece. This data was provided by Vassilis Filippou, Department of Political Research. More information on the institute is available at: <http://www.v-prc.gr>. Accessed 30 November 2004.

Here, the majority of those interviewed favored the cooperation of Greek and foreign security specialists. Of 1,847 people, 81 percent favored cooperation among security organizations. This evidence is contrary to the Greek press' reporting on concerns over armed U.S. security personnel.¹⁴⁸ The debate in the media began over an article in *The New York Times* that asserted Greece was allowing 400 U.S. Special Forces to carry weapons during the Olympics.¹⁴⁹ The debate continued to include armed guards escorting foreign countries' athletes, but statements by Greek Public Order Minister Voulgarakis and by U.S. Ambassador Miller brought some stability against some of the emotionally-charged reports. Greek newspaper *I Kathimerini* quoted Voulgarakis saying, "Visits by foreign heads of state are regulated by a special security protocol" while IOC protocol and Greece maintain Greek protection of the venues.¹⁵⁰

While "solidarity" and "community" is often a sign of strength, it is also a reflection of rhetoric during speeches and summits.¹⁵¹ The actual practice of U.S.-European relations is very much a political process. At the highest levels, competing interests between national and alliance priorities always exist. As can be seen in the definition of alliance, "an alliance is a formal or informal commitment for security cooperation between two or more states."¹⁵² Acknowledging state interests, Walt continues, "The primary purpose of most alliances is to combine the members' capabilities in a way that furthers their respective interests."¹⁵³ Security preparations for the 2004 Summer Olympics between Greece and NATO have highlighted the difficulties that arise when alignment of these interests are put to the test.

Earlier this year, Greek expectations and NATO interests conflicted when the scope of NATO ground troop involvement in the Olympics came into question. As

¹⁴⁸ Note: security cooperation between U.S. and Greece agencies were good according to a 2003 U.S. Embassy Press Release: http://www.usembassy.gr/press/pr07_2003.htm. Accessed 19 May 2004.

¹⁴⁹ Bonner, Raymond and Anthee Carassava, "Pressured by U.S., Greece Will Allow Troops at Olympics," 21 July 2004. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com>. Accessed 14 September 2004.

¹⁵⁰ Andoniou, Dhora, "Truths and Exaggerations About the Use of Arms During the Games," *Athens I Kathimerini*, 22 July 2004. FBIS. Accessed 05 August 2004.

¹⁵¹ For a complete NATO history of the use of rhetoric refer to Ian Q.R. Thomas, *The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination*, (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997).

¹⁵² Walt, Stephen M. *Why Alliances Endure or Collapse*, Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, *Strategy and Force Planning*, 3rd ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2000, 316.

¹⁵³ Walt, Stephen M., 316.

mentioned earlier, on 12 March 2004, the day after the Madrid bombings, Greece formally requested NATO assistance. The general nature of this request however, led to concern about the deployment of the NRF in Greece. For weeks, during high level NATO representative and the Military Committee meetings, General James Jones, Supreme Commander of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) believed, “the security of an international event such as the Olympic Games could not be guaranteed unless he was in a position to deploy the best assets available to the alliance, the NRF.”¹⁵⁴ The issue was not about NRF capabilities, it was about the politics of how the NRF was to be utilized when challenged by the framework of the Greek constitution. Specifically the debate concerned, “Greek sensitivities on the question of stationing foreign troops on its soil.”¹⁵⁵ The political debate focused on Article 27, which states:

No foreign army shall be admitted within the boundaries of the Greek State, nor shall remain therein or pass through without a law passed by the absolute majority of the total number of deputies.”¹⁵⁶

A public opinion poll taken in 2004 revealed support and opposition to NATO assistance:

APPROVAL OF NATO ASSISTANCE ON SECURITY MATTERS DURING THE OLYMPIC GAMES

	April-04 (2) %
Favor strongly	29
Favor not strongly	27
Oppose not strongly	14
Oppose strongly	21
Don't know	10
<i>N</i>	<i>1847</i>

VPRC: Database 1994-2004

Question text: Do you favor or oppose NATO helping Greek authorities on security matters during the Olympic Games?

Table 2. Greek Opinion on NATO Assistance.

¹⁵⁴ Tarkas, Alexandros, “Greek Paper Details Agreement with NATO, US on Olympics Security Arrangements,” *Athens Axia*, 22 May 2004, <http://portal.rccb.osis.gov>. FBIS, (subscription only). Accessed 27 May 2004.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid. According to the Greek constitution, before any armed foreign troops are allowed inside Greek territory, the government must seek the approval of parliament.

¹⁵⁶ Constitution of Greece, <http://www.cecl.gr/RigasNetwork/databank/Constitutions/Greece.html>. Accessed 18 March 2004.

While 56 percent favored Alliance assistance, 35 percent opposed assistance in security operations for the Olympic Games. In order to increase public support of NATO, the Greek government successfully advanced the command of NATO's Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) forces to a Greek Admiral earlier than anticipated. To coincide with the beginning of the Summer Olympics, the turnover of command of NATO's SNFM to Yiannis Karaiskos, originally planned for September 2004 was moved forward to 05 August. According to an article on *TurkishPress.com* this was a move to give command to the Greek officer earlier intended to, "boost public support for the alliance's involvement in the massive security operation for the Athens Olympics."¹⁵⁷ NATO's handling of this issue, however, generally followed the Alliance's principles of solidarity. In a community of member states, NATO as an organization recognizes the importance of national interests within an alliance:

Taking into account the necessity for Alliance solidarity and cohesion, participation in any such operation or mission will remain subject to decisions of member states in accordance with national constitutions.¹⁵⁸

Because of this concern, NATO forces were expected to be beyond the borders of Greek territory in a ready standby mode. The translation of this expectation into decision did not come easy however. The disagreement between NATO's Supreme Commander of SACEUR and Greece's Defense Minister Spilios Spiliopoulos highlighted different expectations between Greece and NATO. In mid-May Nicholas Burns, intervened and helped reach an agreement between the two sides. The agreement called for a "NRF3" force, instead of being deployed within Greek territory, to be on constant alert ready to intervene as a part of a "security package."¹⁵⁹

The Greeks' sensitivity on the matter can be understood given the history of foreign intervention in the Greek spectrum of domestic concerns and national security postures as reviewed in Chapter I. As a good example of public opinion, a humorous version of Greek perceptions on outside assistance to Olympic security is displayed in the below cartoon from a Greek website (with translated text):

¹⁵⁷ "Greece to Command NATO Mediterranean Fleet for Athens Olympics"
<http://turkishpress.com/turkishpress/news.asp>. 16 July 2004. Accessed 25 July 2004.

¹⁵⁸ NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept, paragraph 31. For complete reference see note 90.

¹⁵⁹ Tarkas, Alexandros, <http://portal.rccb.osis.gov> FBIS article. For complete reference see note 150.



Figure 1. Security During the Olympics

The caption reads: “Woman personifying Olympiad carrying Olympic torch; Greek Police on left; NATO on right; black figure of Central Intelligence Service agent.”¹⁶⁰ Concerns about the placement of NRF, with respect to Greek borders, was high enough for Greece’s Public Order Minister George Voulgarakis to characterize the circumstances under which these troops would be used within Greece as a “World War Three” situation.¹⁶¹ This announcement came during a time of protest against the Greek government’s decision to allow U.S. armed guards into the Olympics to protect U.S. athletes and citizens during the Games.

Further considerations of Greek-NATO coordination came with command and control design. Under the security agreement NATO retained command and control over alliance resources from its Southern Command in Naples, Italy. In what was deemed as potentially complicated, one exception to the rule fell under Greek command. “Renegade” aircraft, under a Greek regulation passed after 11 September 2001, could have only been shot down after a decision by the Greek prime minister or defense

¹⁶⁰ Voulgaris, Kostas. Greek cartoon received through FBIS multimedia. <http://www.humor.gr>. Accessed 23 August 2004.

¹⁶¹ <http://channels.netscape.com/ns/news/story.jsp>. Accessed 23 July 2004.

minister.¹⁶² Overall, efforts to protect Greek interests while answering U.S. and international concerns over security was evidence of the competing internal and external pressures Greece faced in addressing security concerns for the Games.

B. NATO’S “OUTER CORE” SECURITY MISSIONS

International concerns of terrorism certainly had its effect on NATO readiness in its contributions of its CBRN Defense team and on the perception of Greece’s readiness to host the Games. Pressures on Greece were manifested through the events of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and the Madrid bombings in Spain on 11 March 2004. These horrific events undoubtedly required more security emphasis in an increased threat environment, but NATO was ready for the task. In one sense, NATO’s participation in the security for the Olympic Games was a decision consistent with its transformation doctrine since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. While this was a significant event for NATO, events such as ongoing NATO involvement in Afghanistan and security training considerations in Iraq somewhat overshadowed NATO’s mission in Athens. Nevertheless, NATO’s actions in assuming a role in the Olympics should be considered important to Alliance continuity in that it follows a conceptual change that runs parallel to its expanded concept of operations from collective defense to its “out of area” and broad security *modus operandi*.¹⁶³ NATO’s participation in the security of a major, global sporting event speaks to its adaptability and overall flexible mandate that has been in place since it was ratified in April 1949. Its basic language lends to considerable political maneuvering and potential for changing national and military strategies.¹⁶⁴ For decades, the “institutionalization” of the Alliance structure and cooperation mechanism has led to diverse capabilities and overall sustainability.

According to Stephen M. Walt, “some experts now see NATO evolving from a defensive alliance into a more diverse, ‘security management institution’, whose purpose

¹⁶² Tarkas. Certain NATO intervention forces were expected to be based out of the “Solbiate Olona” base outside Milan, Italy. Additionally, NATO’s Southern Command was responsible for all air traffic passing through its AOR.

¹⁶³ Paragraph 6 of the Alliance’s *Strategic Concept* describes a defense mission as well as a focus on greater peace and stability in the European-Atlantic region. This document is available at: www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm.

¹⁶⁴ For a short history behind this point refer to Sloan, Stanley R. *NATO, The European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered*. (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 4.

is both collective defense and managing a varied array of low-level security problems.”¹⁶⁵ In this sense, NATO’s participation in the security measures for the Olympics is a continuation of the changes made to the alliance’s purposes as described in Chapter III. In 1999 NATO’s new Strategic Concept affirmed the continuing need for defense as its core mission, but also reflected a new direction toward a broad approach in security missions. From an “armed attack” and the “right of individual or collective self-defense” to increased attention to terrorism, sabotage, organized crime and the “flow of vital resources,” the Alliance took on new security missions.¹⁶⁶ As author Stanley Sloan suggests, “One way of looking at the relationship between collective defense and NATO’s new tasks is to see them as inner and outer core missions.”¹⁶⁷ In this context, NATO’s “inner core” assumes the role of its fundamental collective defense capabilities while the “outer core” is reserved for the Alliance’s new security missions. This distinction is helpful in understanding the expanding spectrum of missions NATO is performing to fulfill its security obligations. NATO participation in providing security for the 2004 Summer Olympics is another chapter in the evolution of the Alliance adapting to new security challenges.

Prior to the Olympics, NATO’s Airborne Early Warning Aircraft (AWACS) surveillance and coordination capabilities proved to be an increasingly useful tool to providing security for public events. Just after NATO ended its AWACS patrols over the U.S. (already discussed as part of the security measures in response to 11 September 2001 and in providing surveillance for the Winter Olympics in Utah), in June 2002 NATO surveillance capabilities, this time, supported the Food and Agriculture

¹⁶⁵ Walt, Stephen M. quoted in *Why Alliances Endure or Collapse*, Strategy and Force Planning Faculty, *Strategy and Force Planning*, 3rd ed. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 2000, 327. For further details for the evolution of defense to security, the author recommends McCalla, *NATO’s Persistence*, pp.466-468 which describes NATO’s “de-emphasis” on defense and references the wider range of non-Article 5 contingency capabilities through its Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept approved in 1994.

¹⁶⁶ The concept of “self-defense” can be found in the original Washington Treaty under Article 5. NATO’s new security interests are referenced in paragraph 10 and 24 of the 1999 Strategic Concept. See note 159 for document location.

¹⁶⁷ Sloan, Stanley R., “Force Planning and Modernization: Developing Capabilities for the 21st Century,” *NATO and Southeastern Europe: Security Issues for the Early 21st Century*, edited by Dimitris Keridis and Robert L. Pflatzgraff Jr., (Virginia: Brassey’s Inc., 2000), 39.

Organization (FAO) meeting in Rome. Later in June 2003 NATO also decided to assist the EU Summit held in Greece.

In late March 2004, after the Madrid bombings, Portugal became very interested in pursuing NATO's security assistance during Euro 2004, the European football finals that occurred during the summer. During parliamentary debate in Portugal it was announced, "The Portuguese ambassador to NATO will formally request that NATO help Portugal strengthen security during the big events which will take place in the country."¹⁶⁸ Mr. Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, the Portuguese Prime Minister said, "the military alliance could provide surveillance planes and offer logistical support during the football finals and a music festival."¹⁶⁹ As NATO AWACS provided surveillance for several more events, to include the Barcelona Forum and the Madrid wedding ceremony for Crown Prince Felipe and Letizia Ortiz in May 2004, just a month later starting in June NATO surveillance and early warning was employed for the Euro 2004 Portuguese Championship.¹⁷⁰

In what amounts to a NATO security package, each event's defense measures were enhanced by NATO AWACS.¹⁷¹ Similar action, with more robust measures and coordination efforts, occurred in coordinating security for the Olympics. As previously discussed in Chapter III, NATO used significant resources to implement security measures for the games, but it would be on a support basis.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁸ *Portugal Seeks NATO help for Euro 2004*, http://www.keepmedia.com/jsp/article_detail_print.jsp. Accessed 19 May 2004.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ As a side note, ironically Greece won the Championships beating out Portugal by a single goal. According to the *New York Times*, the Greek soccer team's slogan was: "Ancient Greece had 12 gods, modern Greece has 11," perhaps anticipating the pride and history that would come with the hosting of the Olympic Games. The full article is available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/05/sports/soccer/05euro.html>. Accessed 07 July 2004.

¹⁷¹ "AWACS Support in Portugal and Spain," NATO Update, <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/05-may/e0513b.htm>, 13 May 2004. Accessed 19 May 2004.

¹⁷² As listed in Chapter III, security measures included AWACS, seaborne defense coordination with 6th Fleet through NATO's Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED), nuclear and biochemical assistance, enhanced intelligence sharing and rapid evacuation capabilities. For more information on related subjects and the overall threat assessment see CRS Report for Congress Order Code RS21833, *Greece: Threat of Terrorism and Security at the Olympics*. Accessed 26 May 2004 through the online website: <http://www.ds-osac.org>.

C. NATO CHALLENGES

1. Burden-sharing

It goes without saying that NATO has experienced its share of burden-sharing difficulties over the years. From the U.S. ratification debates¹⁷³, through the Cold War and to the present day, maintaining equitable contributions between Allied members is an important planning consideration for NATO. The lead up to the 2004 Summer Olympics proved to be no exception. In early 2004 NATO faced mounting pressure to expand its operations in Afghanistan; Greece had just completed its operational planning phase for Olympic security and, at the beginning of January, began its “Security Measures Operational Phase.” Proof of burden-sharing difficulties¹⁷⁴ came from the interaction between NATO and Greece over Afghanistan and the Summer Olympics.

When asked by NATO in February of 2004 Greece declined to contribute more troops to the NATO Afghanistan operations. As any observer could anticipate, Greece’s response was supported by its defense requirements for security measures during the Summer Olympics in Athens. NATO Secretary General Scheffer understood the response, but qualified it stressing the need to expand reconstruction team efforts beyond Kabul, “I realize fully the strains upon Greece in organizing the Olympic Games, but I sincerely hope that after the Olympic Games Greece will be able to participate.”¹⁷⁵ According to Dhimitris Konstandakopoulos, Greece decided during the summer of 2004, just before the Istanbul Summit, to send additional troops to Afghanistan and potentially Bosnia as well.¹⁷⁶

Since Greece began its security reductions for the Summer Olympics in late August and early September 2004, it would appear Greek resources would be more

¹⁷³ Sloan, Stanley R., *NATO, the European Union, and the Atlantic Community: The Transatlantic Bargain Reconsidered*. (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003), 16.

¹⁷⁴ Note: though traditional arguments regarding “burden-sharing” often take the form of debates over defense expenditures as a percentage of GNP (see Thies), for example, this section assumes the outcome as presented is a function of the debate within the Alliance.

¹⁷⁵ Varouhakis, Miron, “Citing Olympics, Greece Rejects New NATO Peacekeeper Request,” NATO Enlargement Daily Brief, *Associated Press*, 20 February 2004.

¹⁷⁶ Konstandakopoulos, Dhimitris, “Commentator on Greek Government’s Foreign Policy Moves,” *Athens O Kosmos tou Ependhiti*, 26 June 2004. FBIS. Accessed 18 November 2004.

available for future NATO training and operations.¹⁷⁷ While Greece needed a full spectrum of capabilities for security of the Summer Olympics, this placed indirect pressure on other NATO allies to contribute to NATO efforts outside of Kabul. Wallace Thies argues the very nature of the Alliance encourages, “regularized channels for bargaining among the members over the distribution of burdens and benefits.”¹⁷⁸ Given Thies’ research regarding burden-shifting¹⁷⁹, Greece’s demonstration of exceeding expectations during the Olympics and its expected contributions in support of expanding operations in Afghanistan reflects an active and responsible NATO member.

2. Czech Political Limitations on NATO

On 25 May 2004, only a few days after NATO and Greece agreed on security arrangements for the Olympics, political delays in the release of NATO’s CBRN team from the Czech Republic and apparent concerns over cost arrangements, caused the Czech Defense Ministry to offer training to Greek soldiers in anti-chemical measures.¹⁸⁰ Ongoing discussions in the Czech parliament over approval of the deployment of the Alliance’s CBRN team, forced the Defense Ministry to look for options in order to meet the NATO requirement promised to Greece. As a result, a Czech Defense Ministry spokesman said NATO had suggested training Greek soldiers as an option.¹⁸¹ In a manner characteristic of enduring alliances, the Czech Republic sought alternatives to being delayed by political pressure. In an effort to avoid “declining credibility”¹⁸² the Republic decided to maintain its credibility with Alliance members, by staying committed to the Alliance’s CBRN defense mission for the Games. In order to meet NATO obligations, the Czech Defense Ministry, in effect, offered to train approximately

¹⁷⁷ Dhimakas, Loukas, “Security Measures Easing, But NATO Forces To Remain,” *Athens Ta Nea*, 30 August 2004. FBIS. Accessed 28 September 2004. Note: Select security forces and NATO assets remained operational in support of the Paralympics.

¹⁷⁸ Thies, Wallace J., *Friendly Rivals: Bargaining and Burden-shifting in NATO*, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 2003), 9.

¹⁷⁹ Thies’ research explores NATO’s history as burden-shifters “intent on transferring to their allies responsibility for the collective effort but without wrecking the alliance from which all benefit,” xiv.

¹⁸⁰ “Czechs Could Train Greek Soldiers in Chemical Protection for Olympic Games,” *Associated Foreign Press* (Paris), 25 May 2004. FBIS. Accessed 27 May 2004. Note: according to the Czech Defense Ministry it was cheaper for Greece to have their specialists trained by the Czech Republic rather than having Czech experts deploy to Greece.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Walt, Stephen M., 319. The author lists this as one of many factors in an eroding alliance.

60 Greek soldiers in anti-chemical protection for the Olympics.¹⁸³ This did not become the final option as there was much at stake for the CBRN Defense team: providing support to the Olympics would be its first mission in which NATO forces were deployed to provide CBRN measures against terrorist weapons of mass destruction (WMD).¹⁸⁴

The following day, Premier Vladimir Spidla in a public appearance suggested the government would ask parliament to utilize the Czech army which consists of chemical experts in the NRF CBN team, for deployment to security operations including the Summer Olympics. According to the article, initial Czech desires to have costs covered did not materialize and therefore explored options to provide the capabilities to Greece. Overall concern regarding the delays in waiting for parliamentary consent upon a NATO request proved to be a considerable factor in the deployment of the team.¹⁸⁵

Finally, after nearly a month of deliberations in the Czech Republic, on 24 June 2004, the Senate approved the Czech CBRN team deployment. Through this authorization, the Czech government agreed to send 100 chemical detection specialists to assist Athens in protecting against a chemical attack. Although at the Istanbul Summit the operational capability of the NRF CBRN Battalion was announced, NATO's effectiveness was hampered by national political constraints. With the NRF's multi-national anti-chemical warfare battalion, located in Liberec, North Bohemia the Czech Republic is the lead country in the project and, "is responsible for the establishment, preparation and deployment of the unit."¹⁸⁶ Although the Czech needed to gain parliamentary consent in advance to support Czech chemical experts in an operation during the Olympics, the parliamentary procedure was complicated and long in duration. These political constraints, however, did not mean a loss of capability for NATO as

¹⁸³ *Parliament to Approve Czech Anti-chemical Unit's Use in NRF Operations, Olympics*, FBIS, 26 May 2004. Available at: <http://portal.rccb.osis.gov>, (subscription only). Accessed 27 May 2004.

¹⁸⁴ Kominek, Jiri. "NATO Learns CBRN Lessons from Duty at the Olympics," *RUSI/Jane's Homeland Security and Resilience Monitor*, 12 November 2004. Available at: <http://www4.janes.com> under the Pre-Incident section. Accessed 18 November 2004.

¹⁸⁵ Prague Czech Happenings, "Cabinet to Ask Parliament for Consent with NRF Operations," 26 May 2004. FBIS. Accessed 27 May 2004.

¹⁸⁶ *Parliament to Approve Czech Anti-chemical Unit's Use in NRF Operations, Olympics*, FBIS, 26 May 2004.

NATO's CBRN deployment was a significant milestone in NATO's operational readiness.¹⁸⁷

D. GREECE AND EUROPEAN SECURITY

Although not a focus of this research, it is important to note European Union (EU) involvement in integrating counter-terrorism security measures in Greece prior to the beginning of the Summer Olympics. As measures in the continuing development of the European Security and Defense Identity (EDSI), the EU Counter-Terrorism Commissioner position, was an office established only in March 2004, as Europe's first response to the 11 March 2004 terrorist attacks. According to an article in the Greek newspaper *Athens Axia* the EU Counter-Terrorism Commissioner, Guy de Vries, advised the Greek Parliament to ratify European laws concerning the fight against terrorism, which include provisions for extradition of suspects and for judicial cooperation. The article continued and stated the commissioner believed, "that any further delay in approving the relevant legislation will undermine the effectiveness of trans-Atlantic cooperation against terrorism."¹⁸⁸

Adoption of the new anti-terrorism legislation was very much a Greek political process. According to an article in the Washington, D.C. Press Office through the Embassy of Greece the New Democracy party "tabled" the additional articles under consideration. In regards to a previously decided upon decision-framework proposal developed by the European Council with the support of the previous Socialist party, the position of the New Democracy was that, it did not feel "obliged," "to adopt the articles word for word and that there were margins for improvements to protect individual and political freedoms."¹⁸⁹

In addition, the article continues and states the previous Socialist government was accused of ignoring opposition party objections. Other viewpoints from legal experts were also apparently not heard sufficiently while not "allowing even a few days for

¹⁸⁷ For a detailed "lessons learned" of NATO's CBRN interoperability with Greek agencies see: "NATO learns CBRN Lessons from Duty at the Olympics," RUSI/Jane's Homeland Security and Resilience Monitor. Available at: <http://www4.janes.com> (subscription only). 12 November 2004. Accessed 18 November 2004.

¹⁸⁸ Tarkas, Alexandros, FBIS article. See note 142 for complete reference information.

¹⁸⁹ *Parliament Passes New Anti-Terror Legislation*, Athens News Agency, Hellenic Republic Embassy of Greece. <http://greekembassy.org>. Accessed 04 August 2004.

discussion of its bill by an expert panel.”¹⁹⁰ Nevertheless, passing the new anti-terrorism laws was only one of many steps for the Greek government. It also has to deal with implementation. While meeting with EU interior ministers, Greek Justice Minister Anastassios Papaligouras promised to implement the EU anti-terrorism measures by the start of the Olympic Games. Under pressure to implement the new legislation, the article attributes the delay in implementation to the Socialist government’s concern about persevering individual rights.¹⁹¹ Although controversial, the passing of new anti-terror legislation served as one of many steps toward security preparations for Europe and the 2004 Summer Olympics.

¹⁹⁰ *Parliament Passes New Anti-Terror Legislation*, Athens News Agency, Hellenic Republic Embassy of Greece. <http://greekembassy.org>. Accessed 04 August 2004.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

V. CONCLUSION

A. GREECE AND ITS REGIONAL STATUS

As in any modern Olympics, the presence of athletes as representatives of their nations stirs up emotions of national sentiment. This was the same in 1896 when Greece hosted the very first modern Olympics at the suggestions of French Baron Pierre de Coubertin. Inspiration to revive the ancient Games came to him in the late 1880s when German archeologists discovered ruins in Olympia.¹⁹² The awarding of the 2004 Summer Olympics, which began in 1997, was only the beginning of Greece's many challenges in preparations for the Olympics. Although Greece's expenditure of approximately \$1.2 billion to provide security for the Games threatened conflict with EU budget regulations,¹⁹³ the increased security measures ultimately safeguarded the Games. For Greece, especially, hosting the Games of the XXVIII Olympiad was an extraordinary event symbolizing its history, culture and nationalist pride.

Like other countries in Europe, up through to the 20th century Greece was a country marked by nationalism. As elsewhere, this was a powerful force that was characterized by many elements of life including state, language, culture and religion. Greece has endured unique hardship through its War of Independence (1821-1832) against the Ottomans, German Nazi occupation during World War II, the Greek Civil War (1946-1949) and later in 1967 survived a military dictatorship for seven years until 1974. Despite these serious challenges, Greece is becoming a contributor to the modern world seeking balance in its foreign policy with the powers of the West and its neighboring European nations.

Greece's ancient history constitutes a heritage and culture and is a source of inspiration today, so artfully represented in the opening and closing ceremonies of the 2004 Summer Olympics. A combination of myth and history are elements described by

¹⁹² Davenport, Joanna, "Athens 1896: The Games of the 1st Olympiad," *Historical Dictionary of the Modern Olympic Movement*, Findling, John E. and Kimberly D. Pelle ed., (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1996), 3. The ancient Games were actually abolished in 320 A.D. during the rise of the Holy Roman Empire and Christianity in which Emperor Theodosius I believed the ancient Olympic Games represented the "supreme emblem of ancient paganism," from the Prologue, xxxviii.

¹⁹³ Carter, Richard, "Athens Will Not Jeopardize Olympics for Euro Rules," *EU Observer*. Available at: <http://euobserver.com/?aid=15607>. Accessed 09 August 2004.

scholars in defining what “nationalism” represents. The objective and subjective elements of history manipulated by individuals to appeal to a greater sum of individuals inevitably creates perception and ideas that are transformed into a culture. Greek Prime Minister, Costas Karamanlis believes this aspect of Greek life is so important that he gave himself the title of Minister of Culture in addition to Prime Minister.¹⁹⁴ Costas Karamanlis recognizes the importance of culture and he, as others do, also look to Greece’s future, “we want to be among the avant-garde of the European Union through reinforced cooperation.”¹⁹⁵ This is a goal very different than the perception of a “victimized Greece;” a label that some believe still exists. When author Konstantinos Kotzias discusses “just and unjust war” he refers to a Greek mentality; a “mentality of the victim, of the conspiracies, and as argued by many, the mentality of jealousy towards the powerful West.”¹⁹⁶ But, he continues and asserts that this mentality is based on myth. The challenges faced by Greece and its resulting successes in hosting the 2004 Summer Olympics prove the vitality of Greece and its “spirited” population. Greece is not a victim. As Kotzias concludes:

Considering Greece’s position in the world today and comparing Greece with its neighboring countries confirms that Greece is far from being a victim of Western imperialism. Although its Western direction was largely compulsory and enforced upon it, it has proved to be most beneficial.¹⁹⁷

Indeed, Greece’s request for NATO support revealed elements of Greek public opinion and national security concerns that have long been rooted in Greek history. Greece must acknowledge its past and look to the future. Greece has matured and it is shaping its own destiny. Since the late 1990s, former Prime Minister Costas Simitis and now Costas Karamanlis are focusing on regional cooperation, including *rapprochement* with Turkey

¹⁹⁴ Migdalovitz, Carol, *Greece Update*, CRS Report for Congress. (Order Code RS21855), 03 June 2004, CRS-3. Note: The city of Patras, Greece has been chosen as the 2006 European city of Culture.

¹⁹⁵ Mahony, Honor, “Greece Wants to be Among the Avant Garde in the EU,” *EU Observer*, <http://www.euobserver.com/?aid=17061>. Accessed 09 August 2004.

¹⁹⁶ Kotzias. Refer to Note 143 for complete reference information.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

and support for Turkish accession into the EU.¹⁹⁸ A recent statement by Yannis-Alexis Zepos, Ambassador of Greece to NATO, supports Greece's policy of looks toward regional stabilization and cooperation with NATO:

Greece has always attached great importance to security in close conjunction with its wider geographical periphery, but most of all through its participation in international organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union and NATO.¹⁹⁹

Regarding the 2004 Summer Olympics, as many would agree, overall, the Olympic Games were very successful. Athens newspaper, *I Kathimerini*, described its success at the level of being “exportable” in that:

Dozens of foreign dignitaries praised the Public Order Ministry for the security...related inquiries have already come from Germany, which is organizing the Soccer World Cup in two years, and from China, which is organizing the next Olympic Games.²⁰⁰

On 14 October 2004 a *New York Times* article revealed a short story on Greece's terror concerns during the Olympics. According to the article, Greece's most serious, at least unclassified, legitimate security threat came from a propane leak at a luxury resort where many high-profile Olympic sponsors resided.²⁰¹ Greece's hosting of a successful Olympics will serve to launch a “new Greece” into the 21st century.²⁰² A public opinion poll taken in September 2004 reflects this sentiment which described Greece as a “safe destination” and a “modern European country” in which the Olympics “has enhanced perceptibly the position of Greece on the international stage.”²⁰³

¹⁹⁸ See FBIS articles “Greece: Government Comments on Mutual Defense Cuts by Greece, Turkey,” *Athens News Agency*, 14 September 2004 and “Greek, Albanian Foreign Ministers Said to ‘Continue’ Political Rapprochement,” *Athens Eleftheros Tipos*, 08 September 2004.

¹⁹⁹ “NATO Needs to Respond to New Challenges,” *NATO’s Nations and Partners for Peace*, Vol. 49, No. 2/2004, 35.

²⁰⁰ Andoniou, Dhora, “Greek Daily Olympics Security Experience ‘Exportable’,” *Athens I Kathimerini*, 29 August 2004, FBIS (subscription only). Accessed 28 September 2004.

²⁰¹ Carassava, Anthee, “Greece Lists Terror Scares During Games,” *New York Times*, <http://www.nytimes.com>. 14 October 2004. Accessed 15 October 2004.

²⁰² For new FDI and economic prospects, see: “Athens Games a Starting Point for a New Economic Course,” *Hellenic Republic Embassy of Greece*, (Press Office Washington, D.C.), 03 August 2004.

²⁰³ “The New Greek ‘Identity,’” *Beijing 2008*. Available at: <http://en.beijing-2008.org/91/61/article211636191.shtml>. Accessed 30 November 2004.

B. THE FUTURE OF NATO AND NATO SECURITY

In January of 2004, the new NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer traveled to the United States for the first time and met with President Bush in the Oval Office. The theme of the visit was solidarity, NATO unity in the promotion of common values and strength within the alliance. President Bush, in an effort to win more NATO support in Afghanistan and Iraq, stated, “I believe in NATO...I believe NATO is transforming itself and adjusting to meet the true threats of the 21st century.”²⁰⁴ On the same visit, Scheffer made a speech at the National Defense University proclaiming his simple message, “It’s time to get back to the basics.”²⁰⁵ While these public statements and speeches serve rhetorical purposes, there is an important reality for NATO behind these words. Rhetoric is, “the medium for propagating conceptions about the nature and promise of NATO.²⁰⁶ Furthermore,

The sheer diversity of conceptions suggests that NATO is a rather malleable instrument, and one that has meant many things over the years...the malleable nature of NATO has given the alliance an ability to change to meet the changing requirements of international political life and, ultimately, to survive.²⁰⁷

NATO’s history is immense and it has often demonstrated its ability to pursue goals beyond rhetoric; goals that successfully combine rhetoric and action are providing results. As demonstrated in this paper, NATO has taken incremental steps in improving its capabilities and expanded its operational commitments. It has developed and approved new doctrine, it has engaged in cooperative security measures and exercises, it has sought out new security missions, it has established and implemented capabilities initiatives.²⁰⁸ NATO knows it needs to do more and it is, but as its members prepare to

²⁰⁴ Sciolino, Elaine. *Drifting NATO Finds New Purpose with Afghanistan and Iraq*, NATO Enlargement Daily Brief, *New York Times* article 23 February, 2004.

²⁰⁵ <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2004/s040129a.htm>. *Speech by NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer at the National Defense University*, 29 January, 2004. NATO On-line Library. 04 February, 2004.

²⁰⁶ Thomas, Ian Q.R. *The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination*, (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997), 7.

²⁰⁷ Thomas, 7.

²⁰⁸ Ochmanek, David, *NATO’s Future: Implications for U.S. Military Capabilities and Posture*, RAND Publication, 2000. <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1162/>. Accessed 16 May 2004. This report lists five key progress areas under NATO’s Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI): deployability, sustainability, effective engagement, survivability, and communications.

accept new burdens, the United States, as the Alliance leader, “must be strongly committed to preserving the relationship and willing to expend the effort needed to keep its allies from straying.”²⁰⁹

In order to better secure its national interests in a global, forward-presence environment, the United States needs to engage in more effective diplomacy with the Alliance’s members and repair the transatlantic rift.²¹⁰ As the efforts to stabilize Iraq are revealing, the “unilateral” option is not the best option. As Donald Abenheim, Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School says, “the key issue, by far, is the U.S. link to Europe. Whatever the many faults, frictions, and fatigue of keeping the United States “in” Europe, the alternative of a United States disengaged from Europe looms as far more dangerous.”²¹¹ While the operation in Iraq cannot be fairly compared to security operations planning for the Olympics, it is the emphasis on the multilateral aspect that is appealing to the strategic circumstances where the U.S. and NATO have the best immediate future. A robust combination, as demonstrated in security planning for the Olympics, of multilateral relations and NATO resources should be used as a model for future “security umbrellas.”²¹² As explored in Chapter III, early U.S. involvement with Greece regarding 17N proved to be an important step in counter-terrorist efforts in preparation for the Summer Olympics.

On the other hand, for European NATO members, if its forces are expected to be flexible and expeditionary in nature, its rapid response capability can not afford to be hampered by national policies and domestic politics. While deployment challenges for the 2004 Summer Olympics were more evident for NATO’s CBRN resources, this logic applies to both NRF and CBRN capabilities. NATO recognizes these challenges and Alliance leaders are taking measures as seen through the Istanbul Summit, to improve

²⁰⁹ Walt, 324.

²¹⁰ For analysis on the transatlantic crisis over Iraq refer to: Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro’s *Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis Over Iraq*. (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 2004).

²¹¹ Abenheim, Donald. “The Big Bang of NATO Enlargement.” *Hoover Digest*, 2003, No. 1. Available at: <http://www.hooverdigest.org/031/abenheim.html>. Accessed 02 November 2004.

²¹² NATO, in fact, promotes the availability of its AWACS and CBRN capabilities as security enhancements to its members should they request assistance in the future. Refer to: “NATO After Istanbul: Expanding Operations, Improving Capabilities, Enhancing Cooperation,” www.nato.int/docu/nato_after_istanbul/nato_after_istanbul_en.pdf. Accessed 03 October 2004.

NATO defense planning and political channels to ensure NATO assets are available for deployments when required.²¹³ While an enlarging Alliance may create the umbrella of a greater security zone in Europe, as it faces obstacles to deploying an expeditionary NRF and flexible CBRN capability, NATO cannot afford to have its credibility marginalized. The NRF and its CBR battalion can be a critical capability in the Alliance's fight against terrorism as long as it can be rapidly deployed.

On a higher level, regarding transatlantic relations, this Euro-Atlantic relationship is in a transition, but it is not wholly a divide as grave as observers such as Robert Kagan suggest;²¹⁴ it is experiencing an Olympic revival of its own. George F. Kennan, the American diplomat and historian, once described the effective systems in international relations as,

The only systems for the regulation of international life which can be effective over long periods of time are ones sufficiently stable, sufficiently pliable, to adjust themselves to constant change in the interest and power of the various countries involved."²¹⁵

As NATO continues to develop its full spectrum of capabilities, it will undoubtedly be able to offer specialized security forces for future events. The United States and its allies should continue to seek political multilateral mechanisms to effectively extend security beyond its borders where their respective interests lie.

In closing, NATO's participation in the security of the 2004 Summer Olympics is significant in several ways. Although its AWACS surveillance (of such an event) had started in response to 11 September 2001 and continued over the 2002 Winter Olympics in Utah, NATO's continuing excellence in early warning patrols and its complement of NRF and CBRN capabilities gave the Games an unprecedented level of counter-terrorism protection. Granted NATO's "security umbrella" can accurately be placed as an "outer core" mission, the Alliance's emphasis on increased security initiatives (without

²¹³ Refer again to: "NATO After Istanbul: Expanding Operations, Improving Capabilities, Enhancing Cooperation," www.nato.int/docu/nato_after_istanbul/nato_after_istanbul_en.pdf. Accessed 03 October 2004.

²¹⁴ For Kagan's analysis refer to: *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003).

²¹⁵ Thomas, Ian Q.R. *The Promise of Alliance: NATO and the Political Imagination*, (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997), 183.

forgetting its core defense purpose) is necessary for safeguarding the freedoms of all member countries. NATO also enhanced political cooperation with Greece serving as an agent to focus on Mediterranean security. The Olympics also highlighted NATO's transformational capabilities, through the deployment of the CBRN Defense team and the NRF. NATO's cooperation renewed its security commitment to the protection of its member countries. The Alliance's lessons learned from the Olympics experience will undoubtedly be applied to future integrated operations and training missions. America, in its challenging mission in Iraq is working to coordinate new efforts toward the fight against terrorism. Underneath the 2004 Summer Olympics was a determined U.S. and allied strategic effort to provide security and battle the threat of terrorism. At the same time, Athens and the world's citizens enjoyed the protection and stability brought on by such cooperative security measures. NATO's resources and coordination capabilities are still proving very useful.

As the Alliance adjusts to events in the 21st century, the benefits of cooperative security measures should be used as a positive means to turn the page in the transatlantic relationship. One can determine that the security for the 2004 Summer Olympics is definitely enhanced by NATO's presence. Its surveillance, command and control, increased CBRN capabilities and political and military coordination channels prove NATO's legitimacy. With increased political and military support from the United States, the Alliance will take several more years to become more fully capable. In this sense, the U.S. must be patient and continue to reinvest in the transatlantic relationship. U.S. national security and global stability depends on continued NATO core defense and its "outer-core" security mission exploitation. NATO's global reach will require continued focus on the "security umbrella" method of operations as seen during the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens, Greece.

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